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THE ROCKY PATH FOR PRIVATE DIRECTORS
GENERAL: PROCEDURE, POLITICS, AND THE
UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF EU ANTITRUST
DAMAGES ACTIONS
Marc A. Sittenreich *
For the better part of the past decade, the European Commission has
engaged in a dialogue with European Union (EU) citizens and businesses
in an attempt to strengthen an almost nonexistent private competition
enforcement system.. In the United States, where private antitrust lawsuits
are most prevalent, litigation is justified on the grounds of both deterrence
and compensation. While the Commission wants to make private damages
actions the primary vehicle for the compensation of aggrieved parties,
recent political pressure has made EU officials claim that government
enforcement will remain the predominant means for the deterrence of EU
antitrust violations. Furthermore, many EU policy makers have emphasized
that they want to avoid what they perceive as shortcomings in the U.S.
private enforcement system. In its 2008 White Paper on Damages Actions
for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, the Commission proposed procedural
reforms to incentivize antitrust litigation in member state courts, but it
stopped short of offering the full range of rights granted to U.S. plaintiffs.
Nonetheless, the Commission drafted a directive in late 2009 that effectively
included U.S.-style antitrust class actions, but it quickly withdrew its
proposal due to strong opposition in the member states.
This Note argues that the EU needs to implement greater procedural
reforms than suggested in the White Paper to make antitrust litigation
practical and desirable for most parties. It also contends that the need for
private enforcement would be more credible if the Commission once again
embraced deterrence as one of its central goals. Finally, this Note
challenges the notion, perpetuated by many critics and EU policy makers,
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that the US. system is wrought with unrestrained excesses and attorney
mischief
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INTRODUCTION
[A] pound of bacon, a peanut butter sandwich, some vitamins-anything
that ADM has a hand in-it's all fixed .... Basically, everyone in this
country is the victim of corporate crime by the time they finish breakfast.1
In the early 1990s, agricultural conglomerate Archer Daniels Midland
Company (ADM) engaged in an international conspiracy to fix the price of
lysine,2 an amino acid used in animal feed to promote growth. 3 The global
lysine market was cartelized well before ADM's entry; 4 prior to 1991, three
colluding Asian companies with American and European subsidiaries
controlled the market. 5 In 1989, ADM announced that it would begin
producing lysine, and in 1992 the company set up its first meeting with
Anjinomoto Co., Inc., historically the leading producer, to fix the price and
set a sales volume allocation. 6 While the companies were not able to agree
upon a sales allocation, they successfully raised the price of lysine by fifty
1. THE INFORMANT! (Warner Bros. Pictures 2009).
2. United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 651 (7th Cir. 2000).
3. Id. at 650; see Yasuhiko Toride, Lysine and Other Amino Acids for Feed:
Production and Contribution to Protein Utilization in Animal Feeding, in PROTEIN SOURCES
FOR THE ANIMAL FEED INDUSTRY 161, 161 (2002), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/
fao/007/y5019e/y5019e07.pdf.
4. Andreas, 216 F.3d at 651.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 651-52.
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percent following the meeting. 7 A full cartel including every major lysine
producer met several times over the next three years with a similar agenda.8
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division began
investigating the cartel's conduct in 1992, when Mark E. Whitacre, the
president of ADM's bioproducts division, informed the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) of the conspiracy. 9 In 1995, the FBI raided ADM's
corporate headquarters. 10 In 1998, after a lengthy trial, a jury found
Whitacre and executives Michael D. Andreas and Terrance S. Wilson guilty
of conspiring to fix the price of lysine in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.11 ADM also pled guilty to price-fixing in the global lysine
and citric acid markets and paid the government $100 million,12 by far the
largest criminal antitrust fine ever imposed at the time. 13
While ADM paid a tremendous fine and its executives incurred jail
sentences, the company also had to contend with parallel private civil
lawsuits. 14 This resulted in an additional $90 million in settlements. 15
Altogether, ADM's price-fixing scheme cost the company $190 million in
the United States, in addition to its executives' criminal charges.
In 2002, the European Commission (the Commission) fined ADM E47.3
million16 for its involvement in the global lysine cartel. 17 Although the
7. See id. at 652.
8. See id. at 652-54.
9. Id. at 654-55. Mark Whitacre had embezzled over $9 million from ADM, which he
failed to disclose to the FBI while serving as an informant. Id. Whitacre lied to the FBI
throughout the investigation, believing that he would be hailed as a hero and become ADM's
new president after the government removed his superiors. Id. at 655. Whitacre's corporate
criminal escapades became the subject of a novel, KURT EICHENWALD, THE INFORMANT
(2000), and a major motion picture, THE INFORMANT!, supra note 1.
10. United States v. Andreas, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1055 (N.D. Ill. 1998), aff'd, 216 F.3d
645.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); Andreas, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
12. Andreas, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 1055-56; see John Greenwald, The Fix Was in at ADM,
TIME, Oct. 28, 1996, at 64. The government fined ADM $70 million for its involvement in
the lysine cartel and $30 million for its involvement in the citric acid cartel. See U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST Div., AN ANTITRUST PRIMER FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
PERSONNEL 7 (2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/209114.pdf.
13. See Greenwald, supra note 12 (stating that the criminal fine that ADM paid was
"more than six times the amount of the previous record settlement").
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. On June 7, 2000, when the decision was rendered, the euro was valued at $0.96. See
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Spot Exchange Rate-Euro Area,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/RELEASES/HI0/Hist/dat00_eu.txt (last visited Mar. 20,
2010). Thus, C47.3 million at the time was roughly equivalent to $45.4 million.
17. See Commission Decision 2001/418, 2001 O.J. (L 152) 24, 68 (EC). For an
explanation of the role of the Commission generally and in the realm of antitrust
enforcement, see infra Part I.C.
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European Court of First Instance' 8 reduced the fine to E43.875 million,19
this was one of the largest antitrust penalties that the Commission had ever
imposed. 20 Nonetheless, the fines that ADM incurred in the European
Union (EU or the Union) were not supplemented by private lawsuits akin to
those in the United States following the DOJ's criminal enforcement. 21
Although antitrust law is extremely important in the EU, 22 private
antitrust litigation is rare in the member states. 23 Public agencies, including
the Commission and national competition authorities (NCAs), handle the
vast majority of enforcement. 24 However, the Commission is seeking to
improve the enforcement network by strengthening private antitrust
litigation in the member states.25 Moreover, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) has reaffirmed that European citizens harmed by a breach of the EU
antitrust rules are entitled to sue for damages in the member state courts.26
18. The Court of First Instance (CFI) is now called the General Court. See Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union art. 256, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter
TFEU] (formerly the Treaty Establishing the European Community).
19. See Case T-224/00, Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-2597,
380. The CFI reduced ADM's fine because of its cooperation with the Commission's
investigation. See id. The decision was upheld on appeal to the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) notwithstanding ADM's request that the fine be reduced or cancelled. See Case C-
397/03 P, Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. 1-4429, 12, 107.
20. See Court To Decide Fine for Price Fixing; on Food Classification,
FOODPRODUCTIONDAILY.COM, June 8, 2005, http://www.foodproductiondaily.com/Supply-
Chain/Court-to-decide-fine-for-price-fixing-on-food-classification. The Commission now
routinely issues far larger fines in cartel cases. See DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR COMPETITION,
EUROPEAN COMM'N, CARTEL STATISTICS (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf (listing the top ten largest cartel fines that the
Commission has imposed on a single undertaking since 1969, all of which were in excess of
€200 million).
21. Cf supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
22. See GEORGE A. BERMANN, ROGER J. GOEBEL, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ELEANOR M.
Fox, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 784 (2d ed. 2002). The two main
European Union (EU) antitrust provisions appear in Article 101 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), analogous to section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2006), which forbids concerted behavior in restraint of trade, and Article 102,
analogous to section 2 of the Sherman Act, id. § 2, which declares unlawful the abuse of a
dominant market position. See TFEU arts. 101-02. See infra notes 103-04 and
accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of Articles 101 and 102.
23. See Press Release, European Union, Competition: Commission Launches
Consultations on Facilitating Damages Claims for Breaches of EU Competition Law (Dec.
20, 2005), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/1634&format-
HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. But see infra notes 129-31 and
accompanying text (noting the recent increase in EU antitrust damages actions).
24. Commission Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules,
§ 1.1, COM (2005) 672 final (Dec. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Green Paper].
25. See Press Release, European Union, supra note 23.
26. See Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Crehan, 2001 E.C.R. 1-6297, 26 ("The full
effectiveness of Article [101] of the Treaty and, in particular, the practical effect of the
prohibition laid down in Article [101](1) would be put at risk if it were not open to any
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However, there are still procedural roadblocks that have thus far quashed
the Commission's efforts.27
Private litigation dominates the U.S. antitrust enforcement system,2 8 but
EU policy makers are unwilling to embrace the U.S. model because they
fear the excesses of a "litigation culture." 29  In the United States, both
competitors and consumers harmed by violations of the federal antitrust
laws can sue for treble damages. 30  Potential plaintiffs are further
empowered by procedural mechanisms such as broad discovery rights, class
actions, contingent fees, and one-sided attorney fee shifting. 31 While EU
authorities believe that a stronger private enforcement system would be
beneficial, 32 they are concerned that these pro-plaintiff mechanisms would
cause attorneys to run wild, harming theii clients and discouraging
businesses from engaging in procompetitive practices. 33
Nonetheless, the Commission has engaged in an active dialogue with EU
citizens and businesses, and it has taken bold steps toward transforming the
landscape for potential antitrust plaintiffs. 34 The Commission's dialogue
has been successful insofar as it has raised awareness of the availability of
damages actions to plaintiffs that are financially equipped to litigate. 35
However, the Commission has faced a tough battle toward implementing
any degree of legislative reform. 36 In 2008, it published the White Paper on
Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules37 (the White Paper),
individual to claim damages for loss caused to him by a contract or by conduct liable to
restrict or distort competition.").
27. See Johan Ysewyn, Private Enforcement of Competition Law in the EU: Trials and
Tribulations, 19 INT'L L. PRACTICUM 14, 14 (2006). See infra notes 125-28 for a more
detailed discussion of the procedural factors that have hindered private antitrust litigation in
the EU.
28. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Comparing Antitrust Enforcement in the United States
and Europe, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 427, 435-36 (2005).
29. See infra Part I.B.
30. See Clayton Act § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
31. See Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 436.
32. See, e.g., Green Paper, supra note 24, § 1.1.
33. See infra Part I.13; see also Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 435-36 (stating that the high
cost of antitrust litigation has led some defendants to settle cases "by abandoning the
challenged conduct regardless of whether it was procompetitive or anticompetitive").
34. See Commission White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust
Rules, COM (2008) 165 final (Apr. 2, 2008) [hereinafter White Paper]; Green Paper, supra
note 24.
35. See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
37. The EC, or European Community, was until recently the first of three pillars of the
European Union. See EU-Oplysningen, What Are the Three Pillars of the EU?,
http://www.eu-oplysningen.dk/euo-en/spsv/all/12/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2010). The EC
consisted of the institutional bodies, such as the Commission and the Council, that have the
ability to create binding laws for the EU. See id. The Treaty of Lisbon merged the EC with
the Union such that it no longer exists as its own legal entity. See Treaty of Lisbon
Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European
EU ANTITRUST DAMAGES ACTIONS
in which it proposed the harmonization of private enforcement procedures
among the member state courts. 38 Among the factors that the White Paper
addressed were aggregate litigation, discovery rights, and the measure of
damages. 39 However, because some EU policy makers have expressed
aversion toward the U.S. litigation system,40 these proposals are distinctly
less plaintiff friendly.41
Private antitrust litigation can have substantially positive effects on the
welfare of consumers and the functionality of an economy. 42 The threat of
a costly lawsuit or a large adverse judgment can deter businesses from
engaging in anticompetitive conduct.4 3 Political factors in the EU have
driven the Commission to assert that deterrence is principally the goal of
public antitrust enforcement and that it is simply incidental to private
enforcement. 44 However, private litigation can still compensate consumers
Community art. 1, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 ("The Union shall replace and
succeed the European Community.").
38. See White Paper, supra note 34, § 1.2; infra Part II.A. For a general discussion of
the meaning of green papers and white papers, see infra Part I.C.4, and for an in-depth
discussion of the Commission's legal and political reforms to strengthen private antitrust
enforcement, including the 2008 White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC
Antitrust Rules (the White Paper), see infra Part I.E.
39. See White Paper, supra note 34, § 2.
40. See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of
American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REv. 1, 6 (2009) ("[L]eaders of the European
Union... hasten to underscore their disinclination to import the 'litigation culture' of the
United States." (citing David Gow, Business Chiefs Attack Plan for US-Style Consumer
Litigation, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Mar. 19, 2007, at 28; Michael Peel, Class Action Lawsuits
Could Take Root, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 30, 2007, at 4)); infra Part I.B.
41. For instance, the White Paper calls for the establishment of an opt-in collective
action instead of a U.S.-style opt-out class action. See White Paper, supra note 34, § 2.1;
infra Part II.A. l.a-b. Opt-in collective actions require that the "victims expressly decide to
combine their individual claims for harm they suffered into one single action," White Paper,
supra note 34, § 2.1, which creates a much smaller group of plaintiffs and limits victims'
ability to seek redress, see infra Part II.A. l.d.i.
42. See Green Paper, supra note 24, § 1.1 ("[P]ublic and private enforcement ....
serve the same aims: to deter anti-competitive practices forbidden by antitrust law and to
protect firms and consumers from these practices and any damages caused by them. Private
as well as public enforcement of antitrust law is an important tool to create and sustain a
competitive economy.").
43. See id.
44. See Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White Paper on Damages
Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, 17, COM (2008) 165 final (Apr. 2, 2008)
[hereinafter White Paper Staff Working Paper] ("[fIn Europe the main objective of damages
actions [is] different from that of public enforcement, the former primarily pursuing
compensation of a loss (even though it also increases deterrence), whereas the latter is
primarily pursuing deterrence and overall compliance with the rules by penalising
infringements of Articles [101 and 102 of the TFEU]."); Jesfis Alfaro & Tim Reher, Towards
the Directive on Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law: Is the Time Ripe?, EUR.
ANTITRUST REV., 2010, at 43, 43 ("[The Commission] now only 'welcomes' deterrence as a
side effect of damages actions."); infra note 166 and accompanying text.
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and businesses for their economic injuries,45 and the Commission intends to
make damages actions the primary means of compensation for EU antitrust
victims.46
This Note contends that the EU cannot devise a fully functional private
antitrust enforcement system until it is willing to embrace many of the U.S.-
style procedures that incentivize litigation.47  Unless and until the
Commission finds a way truly to motivate potential litigants with small
claims and to alleviate the inherent costs and risks, it will not meet its goals.
This Note also illustrates that the political factors that have driven the
Commission to drop deterrence as a goal of private enforcement undercut
the need to reform the current system.48 Moreover, it asserts that the EU
policy makers' resistance to reform is based on exaggerated fears.49
Admittedly, due to its attorney-driven nature, private litigation is subject to
potential abuses.50 By implementing more robust checks and balances,
however, the EU could adopt U.S.-style procedures without disastrous
effects. 51 Thus, EU policy makers' efforts are stalled not for legitimate
concerns, but on purely political grounds.
Part I first introduces the U.S. private antitrust litigation system and
describes the criticism it has received from some EU policy makers. Then,
it explores the Commission's role and its desire to create a more robust
system of private enforcement. Finally, it details the legislative steps that
the Commission has taken, before and after the White Paper, to facilitate
antitrust damages actions.
Part II.A discusses some of the procedural mechanisms that allow for a
strong private antitrust enforcement system in the United States and their
White Paper analogues. It focuses on three procedural elements-
aggregate litigation, multiple damages, and contingent fees. For each
element, it discusses the approach advocated in the 2008 White Paper, the
corresponding U.S. model, and support and criticism on either side. Part
II.B then examines EU fears of adopting U.S.-style litigation in light of the
nature of antitrust litigation and checks on U.S. plaintiffs' lawyers.
Part III concludes that the Commission will not meet its goals unless it
moves toward the U.S. model of antitrust enforcement. Part III.A suggests
that the Commission's shifting concern from deterrence to compensation
makes private antitrust litigation an improper means to fulfill its goals.
Then, Part III.B explains why it would be difficult, if even possible, to
create a workable private enforcement system using only the reforms
included in the 2008 White Paper. Finally, Part III.C argues that the EU
policy makers' criticisms of U.S.-style litigation are overstated given the
45. See White Paper, supra note 34, § 1.2.
46. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
47. See infra Part IJI.B.
48. See infra Part II.A.
49. See infra Part III.C.
50. See, e.g., infra notes 291-02 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., infra notes 304-09, 329-40 and accompanying text.
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nature of antitrust law and the potential checks that the EU could place on
plaintiffs' attorneys.
I. BALANCING EU CITIZEN SUITS: THE COMMISSION'S ATTEMPT To
STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT WHILE AVOIDING THE PERCEIVED U.S.
PITFALLS
In its 2005 Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC
Antitrust Rules (the Green Paper), the Commission described the state of
private antitrust damages actions in the member states as "total
underdevelopment. ' 52 The EU does not have a system of federal courts
akin to that of the United States;53 EU courts may only exercise jurisdiction
over a private antitrust matter through a preliminary ruling, where a
member state court or tribunal can refer a question of EU law to the ECJ.54
Thus, the only place for a private litigant to initiate an antitrust lawsuit is a
member state court. 55 Furthermore, there are vast differences in procedural
rules between the member state courts. 56 The Commission is therefore
trying to harmonize the procedural rules of the member states to put an end
to the "astonishing diversity 57 that has stifled private litigation and that
creates inconsistency and forum shopping.58
This part details the Commission's competing motives in its campaign to
strengthen private antitrust enforcement. Part L.A presents the U.S. "private
52. Green Paper, supra note 24, § 1.2 (quoting DENIS WAELBROECK, DONALD SLATER &
GIL EVEN-SHOSHAN, ASHURST, STUDY ON THE CONDITIONS OF CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES IN CASE
OF INFRINGEMENT OF EC COMPETITION RULES 1 (2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/comparativereport-clean-en.pdf). But see infra notes
129-31 and accompanying text (highlighting that private antitrust enforcement in the EU has
since improved).
53. Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to
Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REv. 179, 191 (2009).
54. See TFEU art. 267. By contrast, U.S. federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
federal antitrust claims. See Gen. Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 261,
287 (1922) (interpreting the "right to sue" under the Sherman and Clayton Acts as "granted
in terms which show that it is to be exercised only in a 'court of the United States"' (quoting
Clayton Act § 16, U.S. Comp. Stat. § 8835o).
55. See Green Paper, supra note 24, § 1.2; Georg Berrisch, Eve Jordan & Rocio
Salvador Roldan, E. U Competition and Private Actions for Damages, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 585, 587 (2004); see also TFEU art. 263 (limiting the ECJ's direct jurisdiction over
cases initiated by "[a]ny natural or legal person" to proceedings against EU institutions and
member states where a regulation or decision is "of direct and individual concern to them").
56. See Ysewyn, supra note 27, at 14.
57. WAELBROECK ET AL., supra note 52, at 1.
58. See Janet L. McDavid & Howard Weber, E.U. Private Actions, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 25,
2005, at 13. Because private litigants must pursue their antitrust claims in national courts,
the lack of a harmonizing directive makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in some
courts than others. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. This can lead to
inconsistency of substantive and procedural antitrust doctrine, and it may encourage forum
shopping, where litigants choose to sue in the court with the laws most favorable to their
claims. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 726 (9th ed. 2009).
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attorneys general" system under federal antitrust laws. Part LB then
addresses EU aversion to the perceived excesses of the U.S. system,
detailing comments by the former European Commissioner for Competition
(Competition Commissioner) and other policy makers' and commentators'
general perceptions of U.S.-style litigation culture. Part I.C explores the
role of the Commission in EU legislation, law enforcement, and antitrust
policy making. Part I.D examines the core reasoning behind the
Commission's desire to strengthen private antitrust enforcement. Finally,
Part I.E documents the recent history of the Commission's efforts to bolster
private enforcement.
A. The U.S. "Private Attorneys General" Model
The United States has the most advanced system of private antitrust
litigation in the world.59 Public enforcement is divided between the DOJ
Antitrust Division, which engages in both civil and criminal proceedings,60
and the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition, which shares
civil enforcement authority with the DOJ.6 1 However, the "well established
and indeed successful" system of private litigation in the United States
accounts for approximately ninety percent of antitrust enforcement. 62
According to one commentator, "the emphasis [of the U.S. system] has
always been on private rather than public enforcement. '63
Private plaintiffs (dubbed "private attorneys general" 64) are authorized by
section 4 of the Clayton Act to sue for antitrust damages. 65 The statute
59. Gregory P. Olsen, Enhancing Private Antitrust Litigation in the EU, ANTITRUST, Fall
2005, at 73, 73.
60. See U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Mission of the Antitrust Division,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/about/mission.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010) ("The Division
prosecutes serious and willful violations of the antitrust laws by filing criminal suits that can
lead to large fines and jail sentences. Where criminal prosecution is not appropriate, the
Division institutes a civil action seeking a court order forbidding future violations of the law
and requiring steps to remedy the anticompetitive effects of past violations."). The European
Commission, on the other hand, lacks criminal enforcement authority and can only impose
civil fines. See Corinne Bergen, Note, Generating Extra Wind in the Sails of the EU Antitrust
Enforcement Boat, 5 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 203, 211 (2006); LARAINE L. LAUDATI, CONSULTANT
TO EUROPEAN COMM'N DIRECTORATE GEN. IV, SURVEYS OF MEMBER STATES' POWERS To
INVESTIGATE AND SANCTION VIOLATIONS OF NATIONAL COMPETITION LAW (1995),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp 1995_011 en.html.
61. Federal Trade Commission, About the Bureau of Competition, http://www.ftc.gov/
bc/about.shtm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
62. Berrisch et al., supra note 55, at 586, 591.
63. Ysewyn, supra note 27, at 14.
64. Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 428. While Judge Douglas A. Ginsburg humorously
describes this title as "oxymoronic[]," id., private litigants, in seeking to collect their
personal damages, often "vindicate important public interests," Hannah L. Buxbaum, The
Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public Interests in Private International
Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219, 222 (2001). As the Commission's Director
General for Competition carries out public antitrust enforcement on behalf of the EU, see
infra Part I.C.3, it is a play on this term that forms the title of this Note.
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provides that "any person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in
any district court of the United States ...and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee." 66  Thus, private litigants have the promise not only of
recovery, but also of treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees.67
In addition to the U.S. antitrust laws, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure grant all civil plaintiffs rights that may facilitate litigation. 68
Class action rights enable plaintiffs to aggregate claims where it would not
be practical to sue individually.69 Very broad discovery rights allow
plaintiffs to garner evidence in support of their cases where access to
information may be limited.70 Furthermore, while the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for contingent fees,71 U.S.
plaintiffs can often initiate a lawsuit without paying any up-front costs or
attorney's fees. 72
Altogether, U.S. procedures combine to create a robust system of private
antitrust litigation that compensates victims for their losses and deters
future violations of federal antitrust laws. 73 However, because industrious
lawyers drive the U.S. system, 74 some commentators criticize it for being
overly litigious or pro-attorney. 75 Nevertheless, the U.S. system produces
65. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
66. Id.
67. See id.; Berrisch et al., supra note 55, at 591; Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 429.
68. See Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 436-37; see, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23, 26-37.
69. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1); infra Part II.A.l.b.
70. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37; In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., MDL No.
1426, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29160, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2004) ("Broad discovery is
permitted because direct evidence of an anticompetitive conspiracy is often difficult to
obtain, and the existence of a conspiracy frequently can be established only through
circumstantial evidence, such as business documents and other records.").
71. See infra note 277.
72. See infra Part II.A.3.b.
73. See Olsen, supra note 59, at 75.
74. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 53, at 191; see also infra Part III.B.2
(suggesting that the pro-plaintiff procedures that are the hallmark of the U.S. system work so
well because they attract industrious lawyers).
75. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 435 (stating that some commentators believe
that the U.S. system may in fact harm competition because some innovative and
procompetitive practices have been abandoned due to the fear of litigation); Eric Helland &
Alexander Tabarrok, Contingency Fees, Settlement Delay, and Low-Quality Litigation:
Empirical Evidence from Two Datasets, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 517, 517-18 (2003)
(explaining that economists have created models supporting opposite conclusions as to
whether contingent fees promote or discourage low-value litigation and whether they induce
or restrict settlement agreements); Donncadh Woods, Private Enforcement of Antitrust
Rules-Modernization of the EU Rules and the Road Ahead, 16 Loy. CONSuMER L. REv.
431, 436 (2004) (expressing the view that class actions may fall prey to abuse, where
lawyers "negotiate large settlements in cases of dubious merit"). See infra Part II.B.2 for a
discussion of antitrust standing and the recent developments in federal pleading standards,
both of which make it difficult for plaintiffs to extort settlements out of defendants on
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far more private antitrust litigants than that of the EU,76 where only a few
cases are initiated, mostly by large companies that can finance an expensive
lawsuit.77
B. The Commission's View of the U.S. Model: Lawyers Gone Wild
In a 2005 speech at the Harvard Club in New York City, former
Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes78 told her audience that the EU
needs to find a way to "foster a competition culture, not a litigation
culture."'79 In an unspoken allusion to U.S. litigation, Commissioner Kroes
stressed that the Commission was looking for ways to boost private
enforcement and strengthen competition while "avoiding unmeritorious and
even vexatious claims" and "avoiding the situation where defendants settle
simply because litigation costs are too high."'80 The previous section of this
Note examined the U.S. system of private antitrust enforcement; this
section lays out the criticism and opposition that such a system faces from
some EU policy makers and commentators.
Commissioner Kroes's comments are not out of the ordinary;
commentary on the EU's adoption of U.S.-style litigation is wrought with
resistance and hostility-even from some U.S. observers.81  One
tenuous claims. Additionally, some criticism of the U.S. system has focused heavily on
potentially conflicting interests between plaintiff classes and their counsel where fees are
contingent on the settlement amount; see infra Part II.A.3.d for a discussion of these
concerns and the federal legislation that placed limits on fees and subjects class settlements
to higher judicial scrutiny.
76. See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
77. See John Pheasant & Janet L. McDavid, Antitrust Law: Damages Cases in Europe,
NAT'L L.J., June 23, 2008, at 12.
78. Neelie Kroes served as Competition Commissioner from 2004 until the beginning of
2010, when she was reassigned to the "Digital Agenda" portfolio. See Press Release,
European Union, President Barroso Unveils His New Team (Nov. 27, 2009),
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1837&format-HTML&aged
=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; New EU Commission Approved, RTE NEWS, Feb. 8,
2010, http://www.rte.ie/news/20l0/0209/eu.html. Joaquin Almunia, the former
Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, took over the Competition portfolio in
February 2010 when the European Parliament approved the new Commission. See Press
Release, European Union, supra; New EU Commission Approved, supra.
79. Neelie Kroes, Comm'r for Competition, European Comm'n, Dinner Speech at the
Harvard Club: Enhancing Actions for Damages for Breach of Competition Rules in Europe
(Sept. 22, 2005), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=
SPEECH/05/533&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 437 (deeming the idea that the EU adopt U.S.-
style procedural rules simply in the realm of antitrust a slippery slope); Nagareda, supra note
40, at 6 (stating that EU leaders want to "avoid a litigation bonanza"); Olsen, supra note 59,
at 73 (describing the EU's goal as extracting the positive aspects of U.S.-style litigation
while avoiding the perceived pitfalls); Ysewyn, supra note 27, at 18 (opining that it would
be "undesirable" for "U.S. antitrust procedural rules [to] be imported into the European
Union wholesale"). The view of the Commission at large is best exemplified in the
Commission Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for
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commentator mentions that U.S.-style class actions "can send chills down
the spines of many EU attorneys, conjuring images of greedy rushes to the
courthouse." 82 Moreover, some view contingent fees as "contrary to the
legal tradition of the E.U. Member States," in that they "encourag[e]
frivolous or merit-less litigation." 83  The Commission is particularly
concerned about the combination of contingent fees, class actions, and the
lack of a "loser-pays" rule,8 4 perhaps because it believes that this gives
lawyers carte blanche to initiate many meritless lawsuits at the expense of
competition and European industries.
Accordingly, the Commission "deliberately avoid[ed] certain key aspects
of the U.S. model of antitrust litigation, such as treble damages and class
actions" in its 2008 White Paper.85 Commentators are quick to dismiss the
possibility that the EU will adopt the U.S. model any time soon, in part
because European society is not as litigious.86 However, this may be an
impediment to private antitrust enforcement, even with greater procedural
incentives. 87
C. The European Commission: Legislative Drafter, Policy Maker, and
Guardian of the Treaties
Often described as the EU's executive branch,88 the Commission is the
main administrative body of the Union. 89 It is charged with carrying out
Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules (the White Paper Staff Working Paper), which makes
constant allusions to the "excesses" of the U.S. litigation system. See White Paper Staff
Working Paper, supra note 44, passim.
82. Olsen, supra note 59, at 75.
83. Berrisch et al., supra note 55, at 598.
84. See White Paper Staff Working Paper, supra note 44, 1 43 n.24; Olsen, supra note
59, at 75; infra note 201 and accompanying text. The "loser-pays" rule is a common
procedural rule in EU member states, where the losing litigant has to pay the costs and
attorney's fees of its adversary. See Nagareda, supra note 40, at 29.
85. Pheasant & McDavid, supra note 77. The Commission did in fact consider doubling
damages in horizontal cartel cases in the Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the
EC Antitrust Rules (the Green Paper), see Green Paper, supra note 24, § 2.3, but it dropped
this option in the White Paper, which calls for "full compensation of the real value of the
loss suffered"-i.e., single damages, White Paper, supra note 34, § 2.5; see Pheasant &
McDavid, supra note 77; infra Part II.A.2.a.
86. See, e.g., Berrisch et al., supra note 55, at 598 (stating that "the European Union is
far from becoming as plaintiff-friendly as the United States" because it is "not as litigation-
oriented"); see also Michael Van Hoof, Note, Will the New European Union Competition
Regulation Increase Private Litigation? An International Comparison, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L.
659, 669 (2004) (explaining that "Europe is generally considered to have a weaker
competition culture and a less litigious society" than the United States).
87. Nonetheless, the Commission's dialogue has already started to break down some of
the psychological barriers to litigation for many potential plaintiffs. See infra notes 129-31
and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., BERMANN ET AL., supra note 22, at 42; European Union, The European
Commission, http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/comm/index-en.htm (last visited Mar. 20,
2010) [hereinafter Commission Overview]. However, the EU does not have the same
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the day-to-day tasks of the EU,90 including the implementation and
enforcement of competition policy.91 While the previous sections of this
Note described the U.S. private right of action and EU opposition to this
model, this section explores the functions of the Commission relevant to
both public and private antitrust enforcement. First, it provides an overview
of the Commission's authority in proposing legislation and enforcing EU
law. Then, it describes the role that the Commission's Directorate General
for Competition (DG Competition) plays in both public antitrust
enforcement and competition policy. Finally, it explains the concept and
use of green papers and white papers in the EU legislative process.
1. The Legislative Role
The Commission is the sole Union-level institution with the authority to
draft and propose legislation. 92 It makes a recommendation only if it deems
that legislative action at the Union level would be more effective than at the
local, regional, or national level.93 The Commission's proposals take the
form of either a directive or a regulation, 94 and the Council and European
Parliament vote on their adoption.95 The Commission also retains an
implicit veto power over the legislative process, as it may at any point
withdraw its proposals. 96
division of powers along executive, legislative, and judicial lines as does the United States.
See generally European Union, Institutions of the European Union, http://europa.eu/
institutions/inst/indexen.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010) (describing the role and function
of each EU institution).
89. See Commission Overview, supra note 88.
90. Id.
91. See TFEU art. 105; European Commission, Competition Overview,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/overview-en.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
92. Commission Overview, supra note 88.
93. See id. This is known as the principle of subsidiarity. See European Union,
Glossary: Subsidiarity, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/subsidiarity__en.htm (last visited
Mar. 20, 2010).
94. See TFEU art. 288. Directives are measures requiring states to pass certain
legislation, whereas regulations are laws that are "directly applicable in all Member States."
Id. Directives specify a legal goal, but they "leave to the national authorities the choice of
form and methods." Id. In the United States, by contrast, Congress may pass laws that
directly regulate individuals, but it may not force a state to implement legislation. See New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 175-76 (1992).
95. See TFEU art. 294. The degree to which the Parliament must be involved in the
legislative process varies depending upon the field of the legislation being passed. See
BERMANN ET AL., supra note 22, at 82-100. Regulations and directives that "give effect to
the principles set out in Articles 101 and 102" are passed through the consultation method,
where the Council can implement legislation, upon recommendation by the Commission,
after consulting with the European Parliament. TFEU art. 103(1).
96. See European Commission, Better Regulation-Simplification, http://ec.europa.eu/
governance/better-regulation/simplification-en.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010) (noting that
the Commission "regularly monitors pending legislation" and may withdraw its proposals
for both technical and political reasons).
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2. The Enforcement Role
The Commission is coined the "guardian of the Treaties" because it
enforces the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and
the Treaty on European Union, as well as directives and regulations
instituted under the TFEU's authority. 97 Together with the ECJ, the
Commission is responsible for ensuring the proper application of EU law in
the member states. 98 This includes taking actions against both member
states that fail to comply with their treaty obligations99 and private entities
that violate EU law. 100
3. The Directorate General for Competition's Role in Antitrust
Enforcement and Policy
In the realm of antitrust, the Commission serves as both a law
enforcement agency and a policy maker. DG Competition works to
"protect[] competition on the market and foster[] a competition culture" by
taking "direct enforcement action against companies or governments"
engaging in anticompetitive behavior and "ensuring that regulation takes
competition duly into account among other public policy interests." 101
Article 105 of the TFEU states that the Commission "shall ensure the
application of the principles laid down in Articles 101 and 102."102 Article
101 prohibits "all agreements... which may affect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the internal market. ' 10 3 Article 102 bans
the "abuse . . . of a dominant position within the internal market or in a
substantial part of it . . . so far as it may affect trade between Member
States."' 04
97. Commission Overview, supra note 88.
98. Id.
99. See TFEU art. 258.
100. See, e.g., id. art. 105(1) (authorizing the Commission to investigate and punish
antitrust violations under Articles 101 and 102).
101. Directorate General for Competition, European Commission, Mission Statement,
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/mission/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2010). The Commission
deems competition to be an "indispensable element of a functioning Single Market." Id.
102. TFEU art. 105(1).
103. Id. art. 101(1). Article 101 specifically denounces behavior that fixes prices, limits
output, allocates markets or supply chains, disadvantages competitors, or "make[s] the
conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection
with the subject of such contracts." Id.
104. Id. art. 102. Such behavior may include "imposing unfair purchase or selling prices
or other unfair trading conditions," restricting output "to the prejudice of consumers,"
disadvantaging competitors, or "making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts." Id.
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DG Competition investigates potential antitrust violations "[o]n
application by a Member State or on its own initiative." 10 5 If it finds an
infringement, then it must "propose appropriate measures to bring it to an
end."'106 If this is unsuccessful, then the Commission must "record such
infringement . . . in a reasoned decision."'01 7 DG Competition has the
power to impose economic sanctions on culpable parties-while the
Commission lacks criminal prosecutorial authority, 108 it is able to charge
tremendous fines. 10 9 Commission decisions may be appealed to the EU
courts. 110
In its policy-making role, DG Competition "works in partnership with
national competition authorities and national courts to ensure an effective
and coherent application of EU competition law," "promotes the private
enforcement of EU competition law," "provides guidance and transparency
about the competition rules and their enforcement," and strives to
"strengthen[] international cooperation in enforcement activities and
mak[e] steps towards increased convergence of competition policy
instruments across different jurisdictions."'' The Commission and DG
Competition are thus responsible for making private antitrust enforcement a
procedural reality in the member states, in addition to conducting public
enforcement at the supranational level. Because of this role, the
Commission and DG Competition are seeking to strengthen private
enforcement in the member state courts.11 2
4. Green Papers and White Papers
The concept of green papers and white papers originates from the United
Kingdom, where the Parliament uses them to identify and plan policy goals
that will ultimately become legislation.113 The United Kingdom acceded to
105. Id. art. 105(1).
106. Id.
107. Id. art. 105(2).
108. See supra note 60; see also Laudati, supra note 60 (noting that several EU member
states, as well as the United States and Canada, provide criminal antitrust enforcement).
109. See, e.g., Mark Gregory, Intel Faces Huge Competition Fine, BBC NEWS, May 12,
2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/8046393.stm (mentioning that the Commission
fined Microsoft £497 million, or $650 million, in 2004 for "abusing its dominant market
position"); supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
110. See TFEU art. 263; Laudati, supra note 60 ("The [General Court] or the Court of
Justice is empowered to review the legality of the Commission's decisions."); see also supra
note 19 and accompanying text (discussing ADM's appeals to the CFI and ECJ).
111. Directorate General for Competition, supra note 101.
112. See infra Part ID; see also White Paper, supra note 34, § 1.1 (discussing the
Commission's efforts to identify and resolve the "various legal and procedural hurdles" to
private antitrust enforcement).
113. See House of Commons, United Kingdom Parliament, White and Green Papers,
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm/cmwib/wgp.htm (last visited Mar.
20, 2010).
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the Union in 1973,114 and the EU has subsequently adopted these
instruments for its own supranational policy-making agenda. 1 5 In the EU,
green papers are "documents published by the European Commission to
stimulate discussion on given topics at European level. They invite the
relevant parties ... to participate in a consultation process and debate on the
basis of the proposals they put forward." 116  The proposals included in
green papers and their subsequent discussion "may give rise to legislative
developments that are then outlined in White Papers.""17  Commission
white papers are "documents containing proposals for [Union] action in a
specific area. In some cases they follow a Green Paper published to launch
a consultation process at European level."' 1 8  White papers that are
"favourably received by the Council ... can lead to an action programme
for the Union in the area concerned."'1 19
D. Behind the Commission's Efforts
The previous section of this Note discussed the Commission's role in
public antitrust enforcement and antitrust policy, including setting uniform
procedures for private enforcement in the member states. This section
explains the Commission's desire to strengthen private enforcement in the
EU. It explores why antitrust damages actions are so uncommon in the EU,
how the Commission's dialogue has improved the state of damages actions,
and why the Commission is working hard, despite some reservations, 120 to
increase their prevalence.
As Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit describes, "The prevailing view in Europe
seems to be that competition policy would benefit from an increased level
114. See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 22, at 10.
115. The EU has a history of adopting mechanisms for its governance and institutions that
are either borrowed from or bear a strong resemblance to those of its member states. See,
e.g., BERMANN ET AL., supra note 22, at 61 (noting that the use of an "Advocate-General [in
the ECJ] is highly reminiscent of the commissaire du gouvernement before the French
Conseil d'Etat").
116. European Union, Glossary: Green Paper, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/
green-paper.en.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
117. Id.
118. European Union, Glossary: White Paper, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/
white-paper.en.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
119. Id. For instance, the 1985 White Paper on Completing the Internal Market became
"the blueprint for the tremendously successful program for achieving the 'Europe of 1992'
by creating 282 legislative measures to advance the "free movement of goods, persons,
services and capital and accordingly to remove the frontier checks and other physical and
technical barriers to trade." BERMANN ET AL., supra note 22, at 542-43. The process by
which EU legislation funnels through green papers and white papers is similar to notice-and-
comment rulemaking, a common procedure in the United States where "a proposed rule is
published in the Federal Register and is open to comment by the general public" before it
takes effect. OMB Watch, Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking (Aug. 12, 2005),
http://www.ombwatch.org/node/2578.
120. See supra Part I.B.
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of private enforcement." 121 Private damages actions are rare in the EU, and
most antitrust enforcement is left to public authorities, including DG
Competition and NCAs. 122 In August 2004, a report found that there were
only sixty reported cases of private antitrust damages actions in the EU-
twelve based on EU law, thirty-two based on member state laws, six based
on both, and ten unidentified. 123 By contrast, private U.S. plaintiffs filed
693 antitrust lawsuits in federal courts in the twelve months preceding
March 31, 2004.124
The Commission and commentators agree that private antitrust
enforcement is rare because of the procedural difficulties that plaintiffs face
in bringing a lawsuit in the member state courts. 125 The lack of opt-out
class actions, full discovery rights, contingent fees, and multiple damage
awards, combined with the prevalence of a "loser-pays" rule, makes it
financially risky for an antitrust victim to proceed with a lawsuit. 126
Moreover, many antitrust victims can only claim a very small amount of
damages, which is a further disincentive to sue, particularly when the stakes
of losing are high. 127 Thus, the Commission, through its 2005 Green Paper
and 2008 White Paper on damages actions, began the process of
121. Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 435.
122. Berrisch et al., supra note 55, at 585; see Green Paper, supra note 24, § 1.1.
123.. See WAELBROECK ET AL., supra note 52, at 1; Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 435;
Olsen, supra note 59, at 74. The number of damages actions has since increased due to the
Commission's active and long-standing dialogue. See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying
text.
124. Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 435.
125. See, e.g., White Paper Staff Working Paper, supra note 44, 5 ("[T]he exercise of
[the] right [to damages actions] in Europe is still facing considerable hurdles. First, the
traditional tort rules of the Member States, either of a legal or procedural nature, are often
inadequate for actions for damages in the field of competition law, due to the specificities of
actions in this field. In addition, the different approaches taken by the Member States can
lead to differences in treatment and to less foreseeability for the victims as well as the
defendants, i.e. to a high degree of legal uncertainty."); Commission Staff Working Paper
Annex to the Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, 30-
43, COM (2005) 672 final (Dec. 19, 2005) (stating that the "principal obstacles to private
enforcement of [EU] antitrust law currently existing in the [EU] Member States" are that
there are "restrictions on collective actions in the Member States"; "that the burden of proof
of causation and damage is on the claimant ... in all Member States"; that "the powers of
national courts to order production of documents are very limited"; "that disincentives [are]
created by restrictions on the amounts that can be awarded"; and that "high costs and risks
involved in competition actions, as well as the length of proceedings, operate as a
disincentive to bringing private actions"); Ysewyn, supra note 27, at 14 ("The key reason
why private enforcement in the European Union is so rare is because of the divergence
between the procedural frameworks in the now [twenty-seven] member states, the majority
of which are not at all equipped to deal with antitrust litigation.").
126. See infra Part II.A.
127. See infra notes 174-75, 236-39 and accompanying text.
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harmonizing member state procedures so that potential antitrust plaintiffs in
every member state will be more inclined to litigate their claims. 128
The Commission's long-standing dialogue has considerably raised
awareness among EU citizens and businesses of the right to damages
actions. 129 For instance, all EU press releases announcing a successful
enforcement proceeding at the Commission now inform potential plaintiffs
of their right to sue for damages. 130 This has led to an increase in private
antitrust litigation even without a directive1 3 1-but only for larger, more
128. See White Paper, supra note 34, § 1.1 ("The current ineffectiveness of antitrust
damages actions is best addressed by a combination of measures at both [Union] and
national levels, in order to achieve effective minimum protection of the victims' right to
damages under Articles [101] and [102] in every Member State and a more level playing
field and greater legal certainty across the EU."); see also Green Paper, supra note 24, § 1.3
("The purpose of this Green Paper ... is to identify the main obstacles to a more efficient
system of damages claims and to set out different options for further reflection and possible
action to improve damages actions .... ).
129. See Roundtable Discussion, Will the European Union Ever See US-Style Private
Antitrust Litigation?, GLOBAL COMPETITION REv., Oct. 2008, at 7, 8 (remarks of Till
Schreiber) ("[W]e expect private antitrust litigation to significantly increase in the EU in the
forthcoming years. We have seen in our practice that victims of anti-competitive conduct in
the EU are increasingly aware of their right to claim damages and are looking for ways to
successfully pursue their claims. In particular, publicly quoted companies cannot justify to
their shareholders not to enforce damage claims which are potentially of very high value.").
The Commission's damages actions dialogue has also made plaintiffs more comfortable with
the idea of filing an antitrust lawsuit and thus has started to break down what some believe is
a psychological barrier to litigation. See Michael Hausfeld & Vincent Smith, Competition
Law Claims-A Developing Story, EUR. ANTITRUST REv., 2010, at 39, 39 (positing that
reasons for the low levels of antitrust litigation in the EU "almost certainly include a
sociological reluctance in most European countries to resort to the court").
130. See, e.g., Press Release, European Union, Antitrust: Commission Fines Plastic
Additives Producers €173 Million for Price Fixing and Market Sharing Cartels (Nov. 11,
2009), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/09/1695&format-HTML
&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en ("Any person or firm affected by anti-
competitive behaviour as described in this case may bring the matter before the courts of the
Member States of the [European Economic Area] and seek damages. The case law of the
European Courts and Council Regulation 1/2003 both confirm that in cases before national
courts, a Commission decision is binding proof that the behaviour took place and was illegal.
Even though the Commission has fined the companies concerned, damages may be awarded
without these being reduced on account of the Commission fine. A White Paper on antitrust
damages actions has been published .... ").
131. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 129, at 8 (remarks of Till Schreiber); Global
Competition Review, Forthcoming Events: GCR Antitrust Litigation 2009: Enforcing
Competition Law in the UK, Europe and the US, http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/
events/569/gcr-antitrust-litigation/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2010) ("Damages actions for
antitrust infringements in Europe are on the increase: national courts are regularly asked to
rule on claims in follow-on actions once the European Commission or national competition
authority has issued an infringement decision; claimants also sue for damages in stand-alone
actions.").
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financially adept plaintiffs with substantial claims. 132  However, the
Commission appears to be more concerned with compensating consumers
and small businesses with lesser claims that cannot finance a damages
action or are unwilling to sue under the current procedural regime. 133
The motivation behind the Commission's damages actions campaign has
shifted over the course of the last decade. At the time of the Green Paper,
the Commission wanted to create a "common enforcement system" where
public authorities and private aggrieved parties work together to "deter
anticompetitive practices" and "sustain a competitive economy."' 134 As
public authorities have inherently limited resources, they cannot account for
every single case where there is a violation of EU or national antitrust
laws. 135 The Commission stated that a greater amount of private antitrust
litigation would "strengthen the enforcement of antitrust law."' 136
Since the White Paper, the Commission has stressed that it is striving
merely to compensate injured parties. 137 The Commission does not have
the authority to collect damages on behalf of EU citizens. 138 Thus, EU
policy makers hope to make private damages actions the primary vehicle
for the compensation of parties harmed by a breach of the EU antitrust
laws. 139 With this goal in mind, the Commission is attempting to alleviate
the procedural burdens on plaintiffs that serve as an impediment to private
enforcement. 140 While it is looking to the U.S. experience as a guide, 14' it
is still seeking a "genuinely European approach."' 142
132. The absence of procedural rules alleviating the financial burdens and risks for
plaintiffs with smaller claims and lesser resources makes it still impracticable for them to
litigate. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text; infra Part III.B.
133. See White Paper, supra note 34, § 2.1 ("Individual consumers, but also small
businesses, especially those who have suffered scattered and relatively low-value damage,
are often deterred from bringing an individual action for damages by the costs, delays,
uncertainties, risks and burdens involved.").
134. Green Paper, supra note 24, § 1.1.
135. Berrisch et al., supra note 55, at 586.
136. Green Paper, supra note 24, at 3.
137. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; infra notes 157, 166 and accompanying
text.
138. Bergen, supra note 60, at 213.
139. See White Paper, supra note 34, § 1.2 (explaining that the goal of the White Paper is
to ensure that "all victims of infringements of [EU] competition law have access to effective
redress mechanisms so that they can be fully compensated for the harm they suffered").
140. See Green Paper, supra note 24, § 1.2 ("Significant obstacles exist in the different
Member States to the effective operation of damages actions for the infringement of [EU]
antitrust law."); see also Olsen, supra note 59, at 76 (likening the situation in the EU to
having "only state law claims in the United States, without the federal overlay"); Ysewyn,
supra note 27, at 14 (asserting that differences in the procedural rules among member states
makes private enforcement rare).
141. See Woods, supra note 75, at 460.
142. White Paper, supra note 34, § 1.2; Pheasant & McDavid, supra note 77; see also
Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 53, at 180 (stating that European reformers, even while
describing their desire to adopt more liberal procedural rules, use a "proverbial 'but,"' as in,
"'But, of course, we shall not have American-style class actions').
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E. The Green Paper and the White Paper: From Deterrence to
Compensation
The Commission has been working toward an antitrust damages actions
directive for the better part of a decade, and the White Paper is merely a
step along the way to reform. The previous section of this Note addressed
the Commission's rationale behind its drive to strengthen private
enforcement. This section takes a closer look at some of the legislative
proposals in the 2005 Green Paper and the 2008 White Paper. It also
highlights how the Commission's policy goals have changed since the
Green Paper. Finally, it addresses the Commission's draft directive that it
withdrew in October 2009.
In the 2005 Green Paper, the Commission squarely addressed the
procedural hurdles to private litigation, stating that "[s]ignificant obstacles
exist in the different Member States to the effective operation of damages
actions for infringement of [EU] antitrust law."'143 Thus, the goal of the
Green Paper was to "identify the main obstacles to a more efficient system
of damages claims and to set out different options for further reflection and
possible action to improve damages actions." 144 The Commission invited
comments from private parties "to consider whether it is necessary and
appropriate to take action at [Union] level to improve the conditions for
stand-alone and follow-on actions." 145
The Green Paper addressed issues such as access to evidence, damages,
aggregate litigation, and costs. 146 For each issue, the Commission posed
policy questions and offered a variety of solutions. 147 For damages, the
Green Paper asked both how they should be defined and how they should
be calculated. It offered the options of defining damages "with reference to
the loss suffered by the claimant," "with reference to the illegal gain made
by the infringer," and "[d]ouble damages for horizontal cartels." 148  To
calculate damages, the Green Paper suggested using "complex economic
models," publishing Commission guidelines, and splitting court
proceedings between liability and damages. 149 Furthermore, the Green
Paper asked by what means, if at all, there should be aggregate litigation. 1
50
143. Green Paper, supra note 24, § 1.2.
144. Id. § 1.3.
145. Id. at 12. The Commission defines "follow-on actions" as "cases in which the civil
action is brought after a competition authority has found an infringement" and "stand-alone
actions" as cases that "do not follow on from a prior finding by a competition authority of an
infringement of competition law." Id. § 1.3.
146. See generally id. § 2.
147. See id.
148. Id. § 2.3; see also ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., POLICY
ROUNDTABLES: PRIVATE REMEDIES 270 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
24/62/39892177.pdf (noting that the Commission does not see double damages as punitive,
but "merely a required financial incentive to support the purpose of compensation").
149. Green Paper, supra note 24, § 2.3.
150. Id. § 2.5.
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It offered a "cause of action for consumer associations without depriving
individual consumers of bringing an action" and a "special provision for
collective action by groups of purchasers other than final consumers." 151
In the Green Paper, the Commission clearly expressed that more private
enforcement would serve a dual goal--deterrence and compensation.' 52 It
noted that, in addition to helping aggrieved parties, "[p]rivate as well as
public enforcement of antitrust law is an important tool to create and sustain
a competitive economy."' 153 One commentator even suggests that the
Commission's goal of private antitrust litigation in the Green Paper was
primarily deterrence and secondarily compensation.' 54 Furthermore, both
Commissioner Kroes and her predecessor, Mario Monti, 155 have stressed
the important deterrent effect of private antitrust enforcement.' 56
By the time it published the 2008 White Paper, the Commission
abandoned the goal of deterrence in favor of compensation.' 5 ' The White
Paper proposed reforms that would allow antitrust victims to collect
damages in compensation for their loss but mandated that any reforms
follow a "genuinely European approach." 158 Accordingly, the White Paper
calls for "representative actions" and "opt-in collective actions" instead of
U.S.-style opt-out class actions 159 and a single measure of damages instead
of the U.S. Clayton Act's treble damages regime. 160 Furthermore, the
Commission did not include any provision in either the White Paper or the
Green Paper related to contingent fees, 161 which allow U.S. plaintiffs to
151. Id.
152. See id. § 1.1.
153. Id.
154. See Ysewyn, supra note 27, at 17 ("The idea is, first, to add another weapon to the
European Union's anti-cartel enforcement artillery and, second, to compensate the victims of
hard-core anti-competitive behavior.").
155. Monti served as Competition Commissioner until late 2004, shortly before the
Commission published the 2005 Green Paper. See Jeremy Clift, People in Economics-
Super Mario and the Temple of Learning, FIN. & DEV., June 2005, at 4, 4.
156. See Ysewyn, supra note 27, at 17.
157. Compare White Paper, supra note 34, § 1.2 ("The primary objective of this White
Paper is to improve the legal conditions for victims to exercise their right under the Treaty to
reparation of all damage suffered as a result of a breach of the EC antitrust rules. Full
compensation is, therefore, the first and foremost guiding principle."), with Green Paper,
supra note 24, at 3 ("Facilitating damages claims for breach of antitrust law will not only
make it easier for consumers and firms who have suffered damages arising from an
infringement of antitrust rules to recover their losses from the infringer but also strengthen
the enforcement of antitrust law."). The White Paper acknowledged that deterrence is
"inherently" an effect of private enforcement, but made it clear that it is incidental to the
compensation of victims. See White Paper, supra note 34, § 1.2.
158. White Paper, supra note 34, § 1.2.
159. Id. § 2.1. For a discussion of the differing impact of opt-in and opt-out systems, see
infra Part H.A. ld.i.
160. See White Paper, supra note 34, § 2.5; supra text accompanying notes 65-67; see
also Clayton Act § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006) (guaranteeing treble damages for
successful U.S. antitrust plaintiffs).
161. See generally White Paper, supra note 34; Green Paper, supra note 24.
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litigate without any up-front costs. 162 The White Paper also addressed
other procedural hurdles that may need modification to allow for more
private antitrust enforcement, such as indirect purchaser standing, access to
evidence, and follow-on actions. 163
While the Commission intends to incorporate the White Paper's
recommendations into a directive requiring member states to adopt
harmonized legislation, 164 it has faced an uphill battle toward reform. In
2009, the Commission proposed a directive that included a de facto
provision for opt-out class actions. 165  The draft directive further
emphasized that the main goal of damages actions is compensation and that
deterrence is merely a side effect. 166 However, the Commission withdrew
its proposal in early October. 167 There is speculation that this was the result
of strong opposition from the member states and European businesses.
168
Some believed that Commissioner Kroes would revisit this issue before the
end of her five-year term, 169 but the Commission changed hands in
February 2010 without drafting another directive. 170  With a new,
Commission and Spanish Commissioner Joaquin Almunia now in charge of
competition policy,' 7 ' the pace at which the Commission's work on
antitrust damages will proceed is unclear.172
162. See Berrisch et al., supra note 55, at 597-98.
163. See White Paper, supra note 34, § 2. While there are clearly many factors that affect
the strength of the EU's private antitrust enforcement system, this Note limits its discussion
to aggregate litigation (and its relationship with the "loser-pays" rule), contingent fees, and
multiple damages. See infra Part II; see also infra note 173 (discussing how it would be
ineffective for the EU to adopt some mechanisms of the U.S. antitrust system while rejecting
others).
164. See Alfaro & Reher, supra note 44, at 43; see also supra Part I.C.4 (explaining the
general role of green papers and white papers in EU legislation and policy).
165. See Alfaro & Reher, supra note 44, at 44-45; Rosalind Donald, Lawyers React to
Withdrawal of EU Private Litigation Directive, GLOBAL COMPETITION REv., Oct. 5, 2009,
http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/ 8952/lawyers-react-withdrawal-eu-
private-litigation-directive/.
166. See Alfaro & Reher, supra note 44, at 43 ("[T]he Commission now clarifies: 'The
proposed Directive takes a compensatory approach: its aim is to allow those who have
suffered damage caused by an infringement of the EC competition rules to recuperate that
loss from the undertaking(s) which infringed the law."').
167. Donald, supra note 165; see also supra note 96 and accompanying text (explaining
that the Commission can and does retain the power to revoke its own legislative proposals).
168. Donald, supra note 165.
169. See id.
170. See New EU Commission Approved, supra note 78 (announcing that European
Parliament "voted overwhelmingly to approve the next European Commission" and that
Commissioner Almunia is replacing Commissioner Kroes as Competition Commissioner);
supra note 78.
171. See supra note 78.
172. See Jim Brunsden, MEPs Fail To Test Almunia, EUROPEANVOICE.COM, Jan. 13,
2010, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2010/01/meps-fail-to-test-almunia/66847.aspx
("Quizzed by several MEPs on what he would do with Kroes' stalled proposal for
harmonised rules on damages actions against cartels, he set out a clear but cautious position:
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Part I introduced the U.S. model and the negative way in which some EU
policy makers and commentators view U.S. litigation. Then, it detailed the
Commission's role in EU antitrust law and its campaign toward private
damages actions. Part II measures the potential effectiveness of some of the
White Paper reforms against the corresponding U.S. procedures. It also
explains peculiarities of U.S. antitrust ligation that may cast doubt on the
EU policy makers' fears.
II. THE WHITE PAPER THROUGH ROSE-COLORED GLASSES: EXAMINING
THE REFORMS AND THE RESERVATIONS
This part addresses both the specific reforms advocated in the
Commission's White Paper and its reluctance to adopt the U.S. model. The
White Paper made several proposals to strengthen the private antitrust
enforcement system; for simplicity, this part limits its focus to the White
Paper approaches to aggregate litigation and multiple damages.' 73
Additionally, it discusses the efficacy of contingent fees, which were
noticeably absent from the White Paper's proposals. For each procedural
element, Part II.A describes the White Paper approach, or lack thereof; the
corresponding U.S. approach; criticism of the U.S. model; and any other
factors necessary to assess the relative strength of the U.S. or EU approach.
Part II.B then examines the EU's concerns in light of antitrust practice and
the mechanisms that the United States has used to prevent misconduct by
plaintiffs' attorneys.
A. The White Paper Reforms
1. Aggregate Litigation
Individuals and small businesses that have antitrust claims often choose
not to pursue them because their claims are too small, or because they
would not be cost effective to litigate. 174 If these parties could band their
consumers' lack of redress at present is a 'real problem and we have to tackle it'; and at the
same time reform should not lead to US-style class actions. He is to consider the matter over
the coming months.").
173. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that all the procedural elements of a
competition system are intertwined and collectively serve to allow plaintiffs to pursue their
claims. At an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
roundtable discussion on private remedies, Professor Andrew I. Gavil stressed that
"substantive competition rules, evidentiary rules, and procedural rules, including rules for
the compensation of attorneys, would work together as parts of a broader mix to create
deterrence and ensure compensation." ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
supra note 148, at 11. Professor Gavil "emphasized that these factors were interdependent;
and changing one without taking account of the others would be difficult and could be
ineffective." Id.; see also infra Part III.B.3 (analyzing the procedural mechanisms addressed
in Part II.A of this Note and explaining how they are interdependent in driving a private
competition enforcement system).
174. See Berrisch et al., supra note 55, at 595; Woods, supra note 75, at 436.
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claims together, they would possibly have large enough damages to warrant
a lawsuit. 175 The aggregating of claims, including modem day U.S. class
actions, dates back to medieval European "group litigation."'176 Ironically,
aggregate litigation is not common in modem day Europe, 177 and the
Commission is struggling to import it back across the Atlantic. 178 This
section considers the White Paper's proposals for what it calls "collective
redress"179 in light of the U.S. class action model, criticism of class actions,
and potential problems with the White Paper approach.
a. The White Paper Approach: Collective Redress
The White Paper advocates for two types of aggregate litigation for
antitrust victims: "representative actions" and "opt-in collective
actions."180  The Commission acknowledged that aggregating claims is
necessary to allow consumers and small businesses with "scattered and
relatively low-value damage[s]" to receive compensation. 181  This is
because of the "costs, delays, uncertainties, risks and burdens involved" in
bringing a damages action. 182 Thus, the White Paper seeks reform that will
allow and encourage these parties to pursue their claims.
Representative actions would be claims brought by consumer groups on
behalf of victims. 183 The White Paper's proposal limits these actions to
charges brought on behalf of identified victims, except in "rather restricted
cases." 184  The consumer organizations would need to be "officially
designated in advance" or "certified on an ad hoc basis by a Member State
for a particular antitrust infringement to bring an action on behalf of some
or all of their members."1 85
Allowing opt-in collective actions would result in a system that more
closely resembles the U.S. class action model, as it would allow victims to
aggregate their claims and file an action directly against the breaching
175. See Woods, supra note 75, at 436.
176. Nagareda, supra note 40, at 26.
177. See Woods, supra note 75, at 444.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 165-69.
179. "Collective redress" is the Commission's term for its proposals for aggregate
litigation, including opt-in "collective actions" and consumer group litigation. See White
Paper, supra note 34, § 2.1; infra Part II.A. .a.
180. White Paper, supra note 34, § 2.1.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. In U.S. class actions, the class representative does not have to identify all the
victims, but merely has to describe the class. See Rachael Mulheron, The Case for an Opt-
Out Class Action for European Member States: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 15 COLUM.
J. EUR. L. 409, 412 (2009). Even U.S. state attorneys general, who can sue in parens patriae
for their citizens' antitrust damages, do not have to identify specific victims while seeking
recovery. See Clayton Act § 4c(a), 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a) (2006).
185. White Paper, supra note 34, § 2.1.
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party. 186 However, unlike the U.S. model, it would require that each
plaintiff "expressly decide" to join the action. 187 The Commission stated
that this would allow victims to recover for their losses while also "not
depriv[ing them] of their right to bring an individual action for damages if
they so wish."1 88 The White Paper proposal does not consider an opt-out
model, nor does it even use the term "class action." 189
b. The U.S. Approach: Class Actions
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes U.S. plaintiffs
to sue "as representative parties on behalf of all members" of a class. 190
U.S. federal courts thus allow individuals to file claims on behalf of others
that are not specifically identified but "merely described."' 19 If a victim
meets the class description and does not opt out, he is by default a member
of the class. 192 A potential class member may opt out of the class to bring
his claim individually, but after a certain cutoff date he is bound by the
ruling. 19 3
The opt-out class action model produces much larger classes than the
opt-in model at a relatively low cost to counsel. 194 Lawyers do not have to
go on expensive campaigns to recruit plaintiffs, 195 and, as opt-out rates
have historically been extremely low, many more parties are swept into the
litigation. 196 The resultantly large classes combine to plead substantial
186. See id.; infra Part II.A.l.b.
187. White Paper, supra note 34, § 2.1.
188. Id. In an opt-out class action, a party that fails to opt out of the class by a judicially
determined cutoff date will be unable to bring an individual claim, and the decision of the
lawsuit will be binding. Mulheron, supra note 184, at 412; see FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3).
189. See White Paper, supra note 34, § 2.1. Presumably, the Commission chose the term
"collective action" instead of "class action" because of political resistance to U.S.-style class
actions. See infra Part II.A. 1.c.
190. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a). Class actions are only allowed in federal courts where "the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable," all members' claims share
common questions of law and fact, the representative parties have a claim typical of those of
the class, and the representative can "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."
Id. The same rule conversely allows for an individual or group of plaintiffs to sue a class of
defendants. See id.
191. Mulheron, supra note 184, at 412; see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(l)-(3); Nagareda, supra
note 40, at 28-29.
192. See Nagareda, supra note 40, at 28-29.
193. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c),(l)-(3); see also Mulheron, supra note 184, at 412
(describing the potential mechanics of a European "opt-out form of collective redress").
194. See Issacharoff& Miller, supra note 53, at 203-04; Nagareda, supra note 40, at 29.
195. Nagareda, supra note 40, at 29.
196. Id.; see Issacharoff& Miller, supra note 53, at 203-04 (listing "inertia" as the reason
behind traditionally low opt-out rates and stating that members have nothing to lose by
remaining in the class because they "usually do nothing"); see also Mulheron, supra note
184, at 430-31 (describing a "surprising array" of "reasons why class members will not opt
in to a group action"). See infra Part II.A.1.d.i for an extended discussion of the factors
motivating (or not motivating) parties in both opt-out and opt-in systems.
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damages, producing a powerful deterrent effect and serving as a vehicle for
the compensation of aggrieved parties. 197
c. Criticism of Class Actions
While EU policy makers are trying to create an aggregate litigation
system common to the member states, 198 they are quick to point out "the
excesses that have been reported from other jurisdictions." 199 Indeed, the
Commission is trying to strike a delicate balance by "facilitat[ing]"
aggregate claims without "'enabl[ing]' litigation." 200 In the Commission
Staff Working Paper Accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions
for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules (the White Paper Staff Working
Paper), the Commission charged that a set of intertwined procedural
conditions in the United States-including opt-out class actions, broad
pretrial discovery, contingent fees, jury trials, and the absence of a "loser-
pays" rule-lead to the so-called "excesses."201 It also noted that Portugal
and the Netherlands, which both have some emanation of an opt-out
mechanism, have not reported any of these "excesses." 20 2 However, many
EU policy makers, member states, businesses, and attorneys still fear that
importing U.S.-style class actions into Europe would bring excessive and
unnecessary litigation, vest unwarranted power in the hands of plaintiffs'
lawyers, and generally harm their competition culture.203
197. See Olsen, supra note 59, at 75; Woods, supra note 75, at 436; see also Issacharoff
& Miller, supra note 53, at 187 (hinting that the primary goal of U.S. opt-out class actions is
deterrence and the secondary goal is compensation); cf White Paper Staff Working Paper,
supra note 44, 58 ("An opt-in collective action system would usually result in a smaller
number of victims claiming damages than in an opt-out system, thereby limiting corrective
justice, and would have as a consequence that some of the illicit gain may be retained by the
infringers, thereby limiting the deterrent effect of the mechanism.").
198. See White Paper, supra note 34, § 2.1; supra text accompanying notes 164-65.
199. White Paper Staff Working Paper, supra note 44, 43 & n.24 (referencing, none too
subtly, the U.S. class action model).
200. Nagareda, supra note 40, at 28.
201. White Paper Staff Working Paper, supra note 44, 43 n.24 ("Excesses in US class
action litigation have often been mentioned, and the risk of importing these excesses into
Europe was raised. It is important to note, however, that the overall legal context in the US,
which goes well beyond the mere class action mechanism, is very different from the one in
Europe. US class actions in antitrust cases are characterised by a combination of features
that is very specific to the US, including jury trial, one-way shifting of costs, treble damages,
wide pre-trial discovery, contingent fees agreements and an opt-out mechanism. The
introduction in Europe of features similar to one or some of these features may not produce
the same effects."). This Note takes the stance that this combination does not lead to
excesses, but rather makes antitrust damages actions a reality for many parties. See infra Part
III.B; see also infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text (describing Professors Samuel
Issacharoff and Geoffrey P. Miller's argument).
202. See White Paper Staff Working Paper, supra note 44, 43 n.24.
203. See, e.g., id. 58 (alleging that opt-in class actions pose "an increased risk that the
claimants lose control of the proceedings and that the agent seeks his own interests in
pursuing the claim"); Woods, supra note 75, at 436 (noting that U.S.-style class actions may
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Critics of the U.S. opt-out class action model argue that it shifts the focus
from the client to the lawyer, who generally drives the litigation forward. 204
Some commentators claim that this allows industrious attorneys to profit by
ignoring their clients' interests and inducing defendants to settle on shaky
claims rather than incur the costs and risks of litigation.20 5 They fear the
kind of litigation culture that they associate with the U.S. plaintiffs' bar-
"greedy rushes to the courthouse" 20 6 and lawyers that "seek[] [their] own
interest[s]" in pursuing cases such that their clients "lose control of the
proceedings." 20 7
Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Geoffrey P. Miller, on the other hand,
argue that the attorney-driven model is what makes the U.S. system
successful. 20 8 They state that "lawyer initiative is the engine that fuels
American aggregative practice. '209  Professors Issacharoff and Miller
contend that it is inevitable that lawyers have the largest stake in a U.S.
class action because they most often involve contingent fees, which are far
larger than each party's individual damages.210 They assert that without
this system, no rational consumer would want to bring a lawsuit on a small
claim.211
d. Concerns for Collective Redress
The previous sections of this Note introduced the competing White Paper
and U.S. approaches to aggregate litigation and described some of the
negative treatment that class actions have received. This section continues
by pointing to various procedural roadblocks that may hinder EU private
enforcement, even with collective redress as detailed in the White Paper.
First, it explains that opt-in collective actions will limit the ability of
attorneys to build sufficiently large classes. Then, it suggests that consumer
groups may not serve as the best advocates for the individuals they
represent. Finally, it discusses the "loser-pays" rule common in Europe and
lead to abuse where attorneys "negotiate large settlements in cases of dubious merit"); see
also Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 53, at 187 (explaining that lawyers' monetary motives
are a "constant source of disparagement of American class actions"). Professors Issacharoff
and Miller offer another possible reason why many Europeans are averse to opt-out class
actions: they feel that "litigation cannot be legitimate, as regards an innocent party, unless
he has voluntarily agreed to join the action." Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 53, at 202.
204. See Bergen, supra note 60, at 218.
205. See Woods, supra note 75, at 436; Bergen, supra note 60, at 218.
206. Olsen, supra note 59, at 75.
207. White Paper Staff Working Paper, supra note 44, 58.
208. See Issacharoff& Miller, supra note 53, at 191.
209. Id.
210. See id. at 186-87.
211. Id. Professors Issacharoff and Miller concede that the lack of contingent fees would
be more palatable if there were no "loser-pays" rule. See id. at 201. See infra Part II.A. .d.iii
for an explanation of the "loser-pays" rule that is prevalent amongst EU member states, and
see infra Part II.A.3 for further discussion of contingent fees.
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posits that the risk of additional litigation costs will dissuade consumers
with small claims from opting in to a collective action.
i. Opt-Out vs. Opt-In
Several authorities, including the Commission itself, assert that opt-out
mechanisms produce much larger classes and better serve the goal of
deterrence. 212 Nonetheless, the Commission, in the White Paper, expressly
rejected the opt-out model. 213 The Commission claimed that it did so to
avoid the "excesses" of the U.S. system.214 It also recognized a political
reality in explaining that "[o]pt-in mechanisms are more similar to
traditional litigation, and would therefore be more easily implemented at
national level. ' '215
However, some commentators have made clear that only an opt-out
system will produce adequate results. In opt-out systems, the opt-out rate
has historically been very low.216 Professors Issacharoff and Miller suggest
that a "rational class member will not opt out" of a class because, with
contingent fees and the absence of a "loser-pays" rule, he has nothing to
lose-he either receives compensation for his injury or loses an "essentially
worthless right to bring his own lawsuit. '217 They further liken plaintiffs'
resistance to opting out (as well as to opting in) to "inertia," 218 implying
that overall, people are more likely to take the path of least resistance.
Professor Rachael Mulheron explains that in an opt-in system, there are
personal, procedural, and economic reasons why plaintiffs tend not to opt in
to collective actions. 219 Personal reasons include that the plaintiff does not
feel engaged in the process, is inhibited by linguistic or cultural barriers, or
would prefer to pursue the claim alone.220 Procedural reasons include that
the plaintiff simply does not know about the litigation, prefers not to bear
the burden of litigation until others have already succeeded, or believes that
212. See, e.g., White Paper Staff Working Paper, supra note 44, 58; Issacharoff &
Miller, supra note 53, at 207; Nagareda, supra note 40, at 29.
213. See White Paper Staff Working Paper, supra note 44, 58 ("[T]he analysis in the
field of competition suggests that an opt-in collective action should be preferred to an opt-
out collective action .... Combined with other features, such opt-out actions have in other
jurisdictions been perceived to lead to excesses."); supra text accompanying note 159.
However, the Commission has clearly considered such an option since the White Paper. See
supra text accompanying note 165.
214. See White Paper Staff Working Paper, supra note 44, 58; supra Part II.A. 1 .c.
215. White Paper Staff Working Paper, supra note 44, 58.
216. Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 53, at 203 ("[Class members] almost never opt out.
In consumer cases, on average, less than .2 percent-two in a thousand--exercise the right
to exclude themselves from the case."); see Mulheron, supra note 184, at 432-33; Nagareda,
supra note 40, at 29.
217. Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 53, at 204; see Nagareda, supra note 40, at 29.
218. Issacharoff& Miller, supra note 53, at 203-04.
219. See Mulheron, supra note 184, at 430-31.
220. Id. at 430.
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he would need more evidence. 221  Economic reasons include that the
plaintiff is worried about the costs of litigation in light of the size of the
claim or wants to pursue the claim individually to receive more money.222
In an opt-out system, the plaintiff would by default be a member of the
class, and thus many of these problems would never arise.223
Professors Issacharoff and Miller refer to the procedural costs of
garnering a large class of plaintiffs in an opt-in system. They assert, in their
idea of "inertia," that it is difficult to attract widespread membership in an
opt-in collective action.224 Thus, attorneys must incur an extra cost in
recruiting plaintiffs, which would be unnecessary in an opt-out class action
system, where a single representative may sue on behalf of a large class
without express consent.225
Moreover, evidence from Canada suggests that an opt-out system is
much more effective in practice. 226 Antitrust class actions are a fairly
recent phenomenon in Canada, 227 and, as of 2006, only some provinces
allowed for opt-out class actions. 228 A consensus among commentators at
an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
roundtable discussion on private antitrust enforcement was that the
"Canadian experience suggests that an opt-out system [is] more successful
in creating an inclusive class than an opt-in system in which only those
plaintiffs participate in a class that have actively decided to do SO. '" 2 2 9 The
provinces that had opt-out class actions also had a more favorable
settlement rate.230
ii. Faithful Consumer Groups?
In addition to "opt-in collective actions," the White Paper calls for
"representative actions," where consumer groups would sue for antitrust
damages on behalf of (usually) identified plaintiffs.231  Professors
Issacharoff and Miller argue that while these organizations can, in theory,
provide for consumer redress, they might not have the same incentives and
interests as the consumers they represent. 232 These organizations might
take into account political and ideological considerations that are actually
221. Id.
222. Id. at 431.
223. See supra text accompanying note 192.
224. Issacharoff& Miller, supra note 53, at 203-04.
225. See Nagareda, supra note 40, at 29.
226. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 148, at 18.
227. See id. at 373.
228. See id. at 374. Canadian antitrust lawyer Donald Houston mentioned, at an OECD
roundtable discussion on private remedies, that the other provinces were moving toward the
opt-out model. Id.
229. Id. at 18.
230. Id. at 374.
231. White Paper, supra note 34, § 2.1.
232. Issacharoff& Miller, supra note 53, at 193-94.
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adverse to the consumers' legal and financial interests. 233 Incidentally,
Professors Issacharoff and Miller contend that lawyers, who focus purely on
their contingent fees, serve as better advocates because their goals are
aligned with those of their clients. 234 Furthermore, they assert that there
might be nothing stopping entrepreneurial lawyers from representing the
consumer organizations, thus defeating the EU's purpose in instituting
representative actions. 235
iii. The Problem of Costs and the "Loser-Pays" Rule
Another commonly cited hurdle to private antitrust enforcement is the
presence in much of Europe of a "loser-pays" rule, where the losing party is
responsible for its opponent's attorney's fees and costs. 236 The United
States, by contrast, has no default fee-shifting rule. 237 In U.S. antitrust
cases, there is only a one-sided fee-shifting rule-a defendant found to have
breached the antitrust laws must compensate the plaintiff for his attorney's
fees and costs in addition to damages. 238 The "loser-pays" rule imposes an
additional risk that may deter a plaintiff from litigating his claim.239
This effect of deterring litigation is a particular problem in the realm of
class actions and aggregate litigation. If an unsuccessful class
representative has to pay his opponent's costs and attorney's fees, then no
rational individual will want to represent a class. 240 One commentator goes
as far as to say that opt-out class actions are not possible in the EU unless
and until the "loser-pays" rule is removed.241
In the White Paper, the Commission responded to concerns about fee
shifting by urging member states to "reflect on their cost rules" as to "allow
meritorious actions where costs would otherwise prevent claims [from]
being brought. '242 The Commission asked member states to try to foster
settlements to keep costs down; set court fees as not to "become a
disproportionate disincentive to antitrust damages claims"; and allow
plaintiffs to receive up-front "cost orders" guaranteeing that they would not
be responsible for their opponent's fees and costs, regardless of the
233. Id. at 194.
234. See id. While incentives for class and counsel are complementary during the
litigation, they may diverge during the distribution stage. See infra Part II.A.3.c for a
discussion of the checks that the United States imposes on class action attorneys to prevent
settlements that are unfavorable to their clients.
235. See Issacharoff& Miller, supra note 53, at 196-97.
236. See Nagareda, supra note 40, at 29.
237. See id.
238. See Clayton Act § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
239. See Nagareda, supra note 40, at 29.
240. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 53, at 203 (asserting that such a system would
encourage free-ridership because no one would want to expose himself to the "loser-pays"
rule).
241. See Olsen, supra note 59, at 75. But see infra text accompanying note 362.
242. White Paper, supra note 34, § 2.8.
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outcome of the case.243 Thus, while the Commission recognizes problems
with the "loser-pays" rule, it has not called for its elimination.244
2. Multiple Damages
Another reason for the relative rarity of private antitrust damages actions
in the EU is the "modest" amount of damages that member state courts
typically offer.245 In the United States, the Clayton Act requires any court
that finds an antitrust violation to award the plaintiff treble damages. 246
Currently, no EU member state offers treble damages to a victorious
antitrust plaintiff.247  However, some commentators observe that EU
member states may make up for this by awarding prejudgment interest,
which is usually not offered in the United States.248
While Part I.A. 1 focused on the White Paper's call for "collective
redress" and its functionality compared to U.S. class actions, this section
addresses both the Commission's wavering treatment of multiple damages
and the utility of multiple damage awards in private antitrust enforcement.
First, it discusses the Green Paper's proposal to double damages in
horizontal cartel cases, which the Commission did not include in the 2008
White Paper. Then, it considers both the benefits and criticisms of the U.S.
treble damages system.
a. The Commission's Approach
i. The Green Paper: Double Damages in Horizontal Cartel Cases
In the 2005 Green Paper, the Commission made several proposals to
define "the actual scope of the damages claim. '249 Most notably, it offered
the option of doubling damages in horizontal cartel cases. 250 Under this
option, damages would be doubled either "at the discretion of the court,
243. Id.
244. See id.
245. Woods, supra note 75, at 437.
246. See Clayton Act § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
247. Berrisch et al., supra note 55, at 592; Van Hoof, supra note 86, at 669; see also
White Paper, supra note 34, § 2.5 (advocating for a full but single measure of damages for
successful antitrust plaintiffs).
248. See, e.g., Woods, supra note 75, at 437; Ysewyn, supra note 27, at 15; Van Hoof,
supra note 86, at 669.
249. Green Paper, supra note 24, § 2.3.
250. Id. Horizontal cartels, where competitors collude to determine price and output,
have long elicited the harshest treatment under antitrust regimes. See William J. Baumol,
Horizontal Collusion and Innovation, 102 ECON. J. 129, 129 (1992). The U.S. Supreme
Court has described collusion as "the supreme evil of antitrust." Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v.
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004). A prominent example is
the global lysine cartel, which resulted in major prosecutions in both the United States and
the EU. See supra Introduction.
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automatic[ally] or conditional[ly]. 2 51  Other options included defining
damages with respect to the loss suffered by the victim and with respect to
the "illegal gain made by the infringer." 252  The Green Paper also
considered whether the member states should uniformly offer prejudgment
interest.253
ii. The White Paper: Single Damages and Interest
Perhaps reflecting the political struggle that caused it suddenly to drop
deterrence as a goal,25 4 the Commission did not incorporate the Green
Paper option of double damages in horizontal cartel cases into the White
Paper.255 Instead, the White Paper advocates for a definition of damages
reflecting the loss that the plaintiff suffered. 256 While it does not preclude
the possibility of a member state multiplying damages, the White Paper
asserts that "victims must, as a minimum, receive full compensation of the
real value of the loss suffered. '257 This includes "the actual loss due to an
anti-competitive price increase," "the loss of profit as a result of any
reduction of sales," and "a right to interest.'258
b. The U.S. Approach: Treble Damages
In the United States, treble damage awards are meant to punish infringing
parties and deter future violations of federal antitrust laws.259  One
European commentator describes treble damages as "central to the private
enforcement of U.S. antitrust law" because it encourages plaintiffs to
litigate and subjects infringing businesses to the risk of a huge penalty. 260
Plaintiffs will not be motivated to sue for only a small amount of damages,
especially if they are not financially equipped to cover their costs. 26 1
Furthermore, "optimal penalty theory" 262 and economic models suggest that
treble damages provide for the perfect amount of deterrence. 263
251. Green Paper, supra note 24, § 2.3.
252. Id.
253. See id.
254. See supra Part I.E.
255. See White Paper, supra note 34, § 2.5.
256. See id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. See Woods, supra note 75, at 437; Bergen, supra note 60, at 220.
260. Ysewyn, supra note 27, at 15.
261. See Joel B. Eisen, Antitrust Reform for Joint Production Ventures, 30 JURIMETRICS J.
253, 268 (1990) ("Antitrust suits are expensive to prosecute for all but the most well-heeled
plaintiffs, making the availability of treble damages almost mandatory for a plaintiff to be
able financially to proceed.").
262. See Ginsburg, supra note 28, at 437.
263. See Public Comment, The Use of Disgorgement as a Remedy in Competition Cases,
Letter from Robert H. Lande, Senior Research Scholar, Am. Antitrust Inst., to Donald Clark,
Sec'y, Fed. Trade Comm'n (Mar. 29, 2002), http://ftc.gov/os/comments/disgorgement/
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c. Criticism of Treble Damages
The Clayton Act's treble damages requirement has been criticized on
various grounds. Some believe that it encourages settlement on dubious
claims because of the fear of paying a tremendous damage award. 264 It may
also make judges less likely to find an antitrust violation, as they would
then have to treble the damages. 265 Furthermore, a common view is that
treble damages, when combined with large class actions, produce
unjustifiably large damage awards266-thus leading to overdeterrence and a
chilling of competition. 267 Moreover, some commentators believe that
multiplying damages is punitive in nature and thus against the culture of the
EU member states, which are guided by the "principles of restitution and
compensation." 268
3. Contingent Fees
Lawsuits require "money, time, and energy," and clients often do not
have the resources to fund a complex case. 2 69  In the United States,
plaintiffs can rely on their attorneys to bankroll the litigation in anticipation
of a percentage of a monetary judgment or settlement.270 In the EU,
however, this is generally not possible. 271 While the Commission has thus
far refused to consider proposals for contingent fees in its reforms, 272 their
absence can be a substantial hurdle to private antitrust enforcement. The
previous sections of this Note considered the White Paper and
corresponding U.S. approaches to aggregate litigation and multiple
damages; this section assesses the Commission's rejection of contingent
fees, as contrasted with their role in U.S. litigation. First, it notes how
landeroberth.htm (arguing that federal agencies should increase the antitrust penalties that
they impose because "damages levels should, for deterrence purposes, truly be at the
threefold level").
264. See, e.g., Ysewyn, supra note 27, at 15.
265. See id.
266. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 148, at 16 ("A
frequently expressed view of U.S. antitrust litigation is that treble damage awards, combined
with the possibility of suits of multiple groups of plaintiffs suits against a single cartel could
frequently lead to excessive damage awards that were not justified under a theory of
compensation or as a deterrent.").
267. See id. But see supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
268. ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 148, at 16.
269. Woods, supra note 75, at 436.
270. See id.; Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 75, at 517-18.
271. See Woods, supra note 75, at 436-37. But see Berrisch et al., supra note 55, at 598
(stating that while contingent fees are not permitted in most EU member states, some allow
fees that take into account the outcome of the litigation); Issacharoff & Miller, supra note
53, at 198 (suggesting that the rule against contingent fees is breaking down in the EU
member states).
272. See infra text accompanying note 273. The Commission has in fact criticized
contingent fees in its White Paper Staff Working Paper. See infra note 274 and
accompanying text.
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contingent fees received no mention in either the Green Paper or the White
Paper. Next, it describes the importance of contingent fees in the United
States. Then, this section addresses the alleged negative effects of
contingent fees. Finally, it explains the potential divergence of class and
counsel interests in class actions with contingent fees and the corresponding
check that the U.S. system places on plaintiffs' attorneys.
a. Conspicuous Absence in the White Paper
Neither the White Paper nor the Green Paper proposes a common
contingent fee for the EU member states.273 In fact, the White Paper Staff
Working Paper listed contingent fees as one of the factors that, when
combined with class actions, leads to dreaded "excesses." 274 EU member
states have a purportedly negative view of contingent fees because they
believe that they attract superfluous litigation.275 Commentators in the EU
and the United States have posited that contingent fees encourage attorneys
to take on innumerable cases in search of a huge payoff and thus risk harm
to businesses, consumers, and competition. 276
b. Funding U.S. Plaintiffs
Contingent fees are common in the United States, and they fund
essentially all U.S. class actions. 277 Lawyers are far better equipped to
finance a case than their clients-they can more accurately assess the risks,
they can diversify their portfolios with several cases, and they generally
have better liquidity and access to loans. 278 With a contingent fee, a
plaintiff can bring a lawsuit with essentially no risk,279 as his attorney bears
the risk for him.280 While the client may not be willing or able to sue using
only his own finances, an attorney who expects a large payoff from a
settlement or judgment will most likely be willing to provide the up-front
legal costs.
273. See generally White Paper, supra note 34; Green Paper, supra note 24.
274. See White Paper Staff Working Paper, supra note 44, N 43 n.24.
275. See Berrisch et al., supra note 55, at 598.
276. See Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 75, at 517-18; infra Part II.A.3.c.
277. See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 53, at 199. While U.S. federal and state
procedural rules do not explicitly permit or forbid contingent fees, ethical rules impliedly
authorize their use. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(1) (2002) (stating
that a "lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or
contemplated litigation," but providing an exception that "a lawyer may advance court costs
and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the
matter").
278. Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 53, at 198-99; see Helland & Tabarrok, supra note
75, at 518; Woods, supra note 75, at 436.
279. See Berrisch et al., supra note 55, at 597-98.
280. See Issacharoff& Miller, supra note 53, at 198-99.
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c. Criticism of Contingent Fees: Meritless Lawsuits and Client-Counsel
Conflicts
Two persistent criticisms of contingent fees are that they encourage
frivolous litigation and that they put a wedge between the attorney's and the
client's interests.281 Some commentators have suggested that contingent
fees cause attorneys to take on a high volume of largely speculative
litigation in hopes of hitting the jackpot with a few good cases. 282
Commentators have also criticized contingent fees for both speeding up and
slowing down settlements. 283 Presumably, these concerns are among the
EU's feared "excesses"--if the concerns are valid, then contingent fees
would discourage procompetitive practices and harm European industries. 284
Professors Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok conducted an empirical
study to determine whether contingent fees truly produce more low-value
litigation than hourly fees and whether they encourage or discourage
settlement. 285  Overall, the results showed that attorneys working on
contingent fees turned down more cases and provided a comparatively
higher quality of legal services.286 The results also showed that contingent
fees were more likely to encourage settlements and hourly fees were more
likely to delay them.287 Professors Helland and Tabarrok assert that this
makes intuitive sense, as a lawyer working on a contingent fee will engage
in more case screening and will not take a case that he thinks will be
unsuccessful. 288 An attorney working on an hourly fee will get paid
whether or not his client wins, so he will not necessarily have an incentive
to turn down a weaker case.289 Moreover, a lawyer working on a
contingent fee may want to settle to limit his risks and expenses, whereas a
lawyer working on an hourly fee will have an incentive to extend the length
of the case and collect as much in fees as possible.2 90
d. Coupon Settlements and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
The Commission fears U.S.-style contingent fees partly because it
believes that they will cause class action plaintiffs' attorneys to wrest
281. See Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 75, at 517; Woods, supra note 75, at 437.
282. See Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 75, at 518.
283. See id. at 520. Professors Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok state that some
commentators believe that lawyers working on contingent fees do not want to settle because
they have the resources to wait for a large payoff. Id. On the other hand, some
commentators believe that they encourage settlement because attorneys want to cut costs and
guarantee that they receive a fee for their work. Id.
284. See supra note 75.
285. See Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 75.
286. See id. at 540.
287. See id.; see also Woods, supra note 75, at 437 (arguing that lawyers paid by a
contingent fee try to settle cases quickly to cut costs and minimize risk).
288. See Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 75, at 519.
289. See id.
290. See id. at 519-20.
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control of the litigation and reap more benefits than the class. 291 While the
counsel and class's interests are aligned in pursuing a judgment or
settlement, there are potentially conflicting incentives at the distribution
stage.292 In Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp.,293 for example, the
plaintiff challenged the settlement of a 1994 Alabama class action where
the class members had to pay far more in legal fees than they received in
damages. 294
A classic example of misaligned class and counsel incentives is the
"coupon settlement" 295
-instead of a monetary award, the class members
receive coupons for discounts on products purchased from the defendant.296
Coupon settlements are attractive to defendants because of low coupon
redemption rates and because the coupons may lead to additional sales.297
They are also attractive to class counsel because they can settle for a higher
face value, which they can use to garner higher fees.298 However, the class
members may not be meaningfully compensated for their economic
injuries. 299 For instance, the settlement of a class action against a company
selling cribs that were allegedly unsafe for infants offered the class
members only a crib repair kit or a discount coupon for the purchase of a
new crib from the same company.300 Due to the timing of the case, the
291. See White Paper Staff Working Paper, supra note 44, $ 58; supra note 203. But see
supra text accompanying notes 208-11.
292. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 148, at 374
("[U]ntil recovery was obtained a contingent fee system actually ensured that the interests of
counsel and the class were synchronized. Once the award was obtained, a conflict of interest
might arise.").
293. 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996).
294. See id. at 508 (concerning the settlement of Hoffman v. BancBoston Mortgage
Corp., No. CV-91-1880 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Jan. 29, 1994)).
295. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 148, at 18, 356
("The use of coupon settlements ... raises conflict-of-interest concerns.").
296. See id. at 18; Congress Makes Significant Changes to Rules Governing Class
Actions, CLIENT MEMORANDUM (Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, New York, NY), Mar. 17,
2005, at 1, 4, available at http://www.willkie.com/files/tbl-s29Publications%5CFileUpload
5686%5C2187%5CCongressMakes_SignificantChanges.pdf.
297. ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 148, at 356. One
particularly bizarre coupon settlement case involved a consumer lawsuit against a cruise line
that had gone out of business. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 16 (2005), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 16. Recognizing a potential profit opportunity, a completely different
cruise line that was not a party to the litigation offered the class members discount coupons
as part of the settlement. See id.
298. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 148, at 356. But
see infra note 306 and accompanying text.
299. See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 148, at 356, 376
("Concerns could arise if attorneys tried to get fees based on the face value of coupons,
without regard to actual redemption rates."). But see id. at 18 ("[S]peakers also suggested
that there can be cases where coupon settlements can be a potentially valuable remedy, for
example where the total damage award is rather low or when the defendant has a credible
claim that it cannot afford cash payments.").
300. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 17, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 17.
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class members could only use their awards if they planned to have another
child and still trusted the company's products. 30 1 Countless other cases
have similarly yielded little to no benefit for most class members while
rewarding their attorneys handsomely. 30 2
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) 30 3 places a significant
check on the use of coupon settlements. 304 While CAFA does not ban their
use, it sets limits on attorneys' fees and subjects coupon settlement
agreements to higher judicial scrutiny. 30 5 First, CAFA requires that the fees
distributed to attorneys be "based on the value to class members of the
coupons that are redeemed" and not simply on the face value of the
coupons. 306  Second, CAFA requires a judicial hearing and written
statement that "the settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate for class
members" before a court can approve a coupon settlement. 307 Furthermore,
the statute aims to eradicate the issue faced in Kamilewicz30 8 by allowing
class counsel to settle at a monetary net loss for class members only where
there is a "written finding that nonmonetary benefits to the class member
substantially outweigh the monetary loss. ' ' 309
B. The Commission's Fears in Context
The Commission is generally worried about the excesses that it believes
U.S.-style litigation would bring to EU antitrust enforcement. 310 However,
the field of antitrust has special characteristics that tend to limit the
practicability of litigation for parties without a strong claim.311 Moreover,
U.S. antitrust litigation offers vigorous checks on the ability of plaintiffs to
state a claim sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 312 While the last
section focused on three procedural factors--class actions, treble damages,
and contingent fees-that have a bearing on the viability of a private
antitrust enforcement system, this section shifts the discussion to the EU
fears of U.S.-style antitrust litigation. Part II.B.1 discusses features of
antitrust litigation that make it less susceptible to attorney mischief, and
301. Id.
302. See id. at 15-20, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 16-21.
303. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711-1715 (2006).
304. See id. § 1712.
305. See id.; ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 148, at 358.
306. 28 U.S.C. § 1712(a). Courts "may, in [their] discretion upon the motion of a party,
receive expert testimony from a witness qualified to provide information on the actual value
to the class members of the coupons that are redeemed." Id. § 1712(d). Fees that are not
contingent on the settlement amount "shall be based upon the amount of time class counsel
reasonably expended working on the action." Id. § 1712(b)(1). Fees that are "calculated on a
mixed basis" are subject to both rules for their respective components. Id. § 1712(c).
307. Id. § 1712(e).
308. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
309. 28 U.S.C. § 1713.
310. See supra Part I.B.
311. See infra Part 11.B. 1.
312. See infra Part II.B.2.
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Part II.B.2 describes some of the procedural restraints that limit the amount
of tenuous antitrust claims.
1. Features of Antitrust Litigation
The debate on the efficacy of U.S.-style private antitrust enforcement is
not unique to the EU-some American commentators have also criticized
the U.S. system for bringing about superfluous litigation. 313 Like their
European counterparts, they are concerned that the U.S. system allows
plaintiffs' attorneys to "extort large settlements" and "deters efficient,
procompetitive business behavior." 314
In conducting an empirical study, Professors Steven C. Salop and
Lawrence J. White establish a conceptual framework to determine whether
the U.S. private antitrust litigation system truly deserves its criticism. They
explain that antitrust litigation is in essence an exchange between rational
financial actors.315  Each party responds to economic incentives 316-
potential plaintiffs are more likely to sue when their probability of success
is higher, litigation costs are lower, and potential damages are higher;
potential defendants will more likely abandon certain conduct if the
probability that a lawsuit will be brought, the probability of losing that suit,
the litigation costs, and the potential damages are higher.317
Professors Salop and White contend that while the United States' pro-
plaintiff procedural mechanisms change incentives, they do not necessarily
increase litigation.3 18 For instance, while one might expect treble damages
to lead to more lawsuits, it could actually reduce litigation due to the
deterrent effect on potential defendants. 319 Moreover, with one-sided fee
shifting, higher legal fees for a potential plaintiff could simultaneously
serve as a disincentive for plaintiffs to sue and a deterrent for potential
defendants. 320
Professors Salop and White also attack the presumption that U.S.-style
antitrust litigation can harm legitimate, procompetitive business behavior.
First, they challenge the assertion that the expenses and risks of antitrust
litigation force parties to settle on dubious claims by explaining that
defendants will not choose to settle when they believe that the claims
313. See Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Antitrust
Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1001 & n.1 (1986).
314. Id.; see supra note 75.
315. See Salop & White, supra note 313, at 1018, 1050 ("Antitrust litigation ultimately is
a financial proposition involving stakes and costs.").
316. See id.
317. Id. at 1019.
318. See id. at 1020-21.
319. Cf id. ("A low level of complaints may be the consequence of a high level of
deterrence and few violations, or it may indicate a low level of deterrence because of
insufficient incentives to initiate suits."). Professors Salop and White refer to this as the
"Laffer Curve of Litigation." Id. at 1020, 1021 fig. 1.
320. See id. at 1020-21.
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against them have no genuine merit.321 Second, they contend that the threat
of meritless litigation will not deter a defendant's procompetitive
conduct. 322 They state that "a court can probably detect and penalize
frivolous suits more easily than frivolous defenses." 323
Furthermore, antitrust is somewhat unique in U.S. litigation in that there
are very few cases324 and each one is both complex and lengthy. 325
Antitrust plaintiffs' attorneys, like all attorneys who work on contingent
fees, have to diversify their risk with a portfolio of cases. 326 However, it
stands to reason that, with fewer, longer, and more complex cases, antitrust
attorneys will be more careful in selecting the claims that are most likely to
succeed. 327
2. Antitrust Injury and Plausibility
The U.S. system imposes strict requirements on both the amount of facts
needed to state a claim and the necessary standing to initiate an antitrust
lawsuit. While the previous section of this Note described reasons why
antitrust litigation is less vulnerable to abuse than some EU authorities
believe, this section addresses some of the hurdles that U.S. antitrust law
has deliberately imposed so that plaintiffs do not run wild and harm
competition.
321. See id. at 1026 ("In essence, the cases that the defendant is less likely to settle tend
to be those for which he feels the plaintiff's chances of winning are low enough that the
risky consequences for other cases are tolerable."). But see id. at 1029 (acknowledging that it
would be easier for a plaintiff to use "extortion tactics" to extract a settlement where it is
"relatively more expensive for the [defendant] and less expensive for the extortionist" to
conduct the litigation). However, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently made it harder for
plaintiffs with tenuous claims to survive motion to dismiss in federal courts. See Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); infra Part II.B.2.
322. See Salop & White, supra note 313, at 1029 ("[U]nless the plaintiff has a reasonable
chance of success, the threat of litigation will not be credible.").
323. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 335-40 (discussing the pleading standard
that the Supreme Court announced in 2008 to limit frivolous claims).
324. There were approximately 1500 private antitrust filings in the United States in 2008.
Joseph Ostoyich, David Emanuelson & Parker Normann, More of the Same: Growth in
Private Antitrust Litigation and Cutbacks by the U.S. Supreme Court, ANTITRUST REV. AM.,
2009, at 46, 46 (estimating an increase from under 1100 in both 2006 and 2007). In the
same year, there were 267,257 civil filings in the U.S. federal court system. Press Release,
U.S. Courts, Workload of the Federal Courts Grows in Fiscal Year 2008 (Mar. 17, 2009),
http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/2009/caseload.cfmi.
325. See Salop & White, supra note 313, at 1009 & tbl.7 (asserting that, in their empirical
data, the average antitrust case lasted 24.9 months, the average Multidistrict Litigation
antitrust case lasted 5.7 years, and the average docket for an antitrust case was 8.2 inches
thick); see also White Paper, supra note 34, § 2.8 ("[Antitrust damages] actions may be
particularly costly and are generally more complex and time-consuming than other kinds of
civil action.").
326. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 278-80.
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In its landmark 1977 decision Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc.,328 the U.S. Supreme Court held that to establish standing to allege a
claim under the federal antitrust laws, a plaintiff needs to show "antitrust
injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to
prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts
unlawful. 329  In Brunswick, the respondents, three bowling centers,
challenged the petitioner, one of the two largest manufacturers of bowling
equipment, under section 7 of the Clayton Act 330 for the acquisition of their
rivals in three distinct markets.331 Because the rivals were going out of
business, the respondents sought treble damages for the additional profits
they would have gained had they left the respective markets.332 The Court
stated that "[e]very merger . . . has the potential for producing economic
readjustments that adversely affect some persons. But Congress ...has
condemned them only when they may produce anticompetitive effects." 333
The Court has subsequently broadened the concept of "antitrust injury" to
"demand[] that every private plaintiff provide a clear articulation of both a
theory of anticompetitive effects and allegations of personal injury directly
tied to those effects." 334
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recently made it far more difficult
for a plaintiff to state any claim in the federal courts. In Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly,335 the respondent class alleged that the petitioners engaged in a
conspiracy to restrict new entry and allocate markets in the telephone
service industry in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.336 The Court
held that to plead a conspiracy successfully under section 1, a plaintiff must
present "plausible grounds to infer an agreement. '337 It explained that a
complaint will not survive a motion to dismiss without "enough factual
matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made. '338 The
Court reasoned that without this rule, a plaintiff with "'a largely groundless
claim"' would be allowed to conduct protracted and expensive discovery to
scare a defendant into a high settlement value. 339 Thus, the plausibility
requirement allows U.S. federal courts to weed out meritless claims fairly
328. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
329. Id. at 489.
330. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006) (forbidding mergers and acquisitions where
"the effect ... may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly").
331. See Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 479-80.
332. See id. at 480-81.
333. Id. at 487.
334. ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN
PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 897 (2d ed. 2008).
335. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
336. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550-51.
337. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 558 (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
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easily so that plaintiffs do not extort settlements due to the threat of high
litigation costs. 340
Part II considered the efficacy of both the White Paper reforms and EU
resistance to adopting U.S.-style antitrust litigation. First, it assessed the
benefits and drawbacks of some of the White Paper's proposals aimed to
bolster private antitrust enforcement and the corresponding U.S.
approaches. Then, it discussed the nature of antitrust practice and the
restraints on U.S. plaintiffs that contrast with some EU policy makers'
views of the U.S. system. Part III argues that the EU must edge toward the
U.S. model to establish a fully functional private enforcement system.
Furthermore, it asserts that the concerns of "excess" that have caused the
Commission to restate its goals and have stalled its damages actions
campaign are exaggerated and merely political.
III. "EXCESSES" AND SHORTAGES: DUBIOUS FEARS ARE THE
ROADBLOCKS TO REFORM
The White Paper's proposed reforms, if implemented in their present
form, would not likely produce a private antitrust enforcement system
sufficient to meet the Commission's goals.34' In its desire to avoid the
alleged shortcomings of the U.S. system, the Commission is ignoring the
key procedural mechanisms that work together to make antitrust litigation a
reality for most parties.342 Furthermore, the EU policy makers' fears of
U.S.-style litigation are misguided-importing some of the U.S. procedures
that enable private enforcement will not result in the "excesses" that the
Commission so gravely predicts. 343
This Note draws three conclusions about the EU antitrust damages
actions campaign. First, the Commission's shift in focus from deterrence
and compensation to purely compensation negatively impacts upon the
practicability (and desirability) of reform. Second, the White Paper's
proposals, if enacted, would not have a noticeable impact on the level of
private antitrust enforcement beyond what has already occurred. Third, EU
criticism of the U.S. system is far overstated-with sufficient checks on
plaintiffs' attorneys, private litigation will not become excessive or harm
competition.
340. See id. at 559.
341. See supra Part I.D. Although the Commission has raised awareness for antitrust
damages actions, which has increased private enforcement somewhat, see supra notes 129-
31 and accompanying text, it cannot create a sufficient vehicle for the compensation of
parties with smaller injuries and less resources without implementing greater procedural
reforms.
342. See supra Part II.A.
343. See supra Parts IB, II.A.l.c.
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A. Straightening the Commission's Priorities
The Commission's recent paradigm shift away from deterrence and
toward compensation casts a substantial veil over the efficacy of many of
its proposed reforms.344 For instance, the White Paper calls for opt-in
collective actions where claims are too small to be brought individually. 345
U.S.-style class actions are justified on the grounds of both deterrence and
compensation--each plaintiff collects damages, infringing parties are
punished, and companies refrain from future anticompetitive behavior.346
Thus, in U.S.-style class actions, the combined damage award that the
defendant has to pay is equally as important as each plaintiffs share. 347 If
the Commission only worries about parties receiving compensation for their
losses, and deterrence is a mere side effect,348 then it should focus on what
each plaintiff receives individually. The Commission's campaign,
including its call for collective redress, has focused largely on claims that
are too low to litigate under the current procedural regime.349 Because
these claims are small, there is little benefit to the stakeholders. Without
the goal of deterrence, one would think that these are a rather low priority.
In a similar fashion, other procedural mechanisms that bolster private
enforcement do not make sense within the Commission's new
framework. 350 For example, trebling damages, by its very nature, affords
plaintiffs more in damages than the loss they suffered. If the goal of
instituting procedural reforms is both deterrence and compensation, then it
makes sense to multiply damages. 351 If compensation is the only goal,
however, then doing so is somewhat counterintuitive. 352 Nonetheless,
without the lure of treble damages, many potential plaintiffs will choose not
to litigate, and injured parties will not receive the compensation that the
Commission is working hard for them to receive. 353
Therefore, the Commission's policy shift, even if meant to ease the
passage of legislation, countermands the need for and the ability to instigate
more private antitrust enforcement. If a party has a sufficiently large claim,
it may choose to litigate even without a new directive.354 Collective redress
344. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 159, 186-89 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
349. See supra text accompanying note 181.
350. See infra Part 1II.B.
351. See supra notes 259-63 and accompanying text.
352. However, in the Green Paper, the Commission proposed double damages in
horizontal cartel cases primarily as a means to lure plaintiffs into court. See ORGANISATION
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 148, at 270. Nevertheless, because it did not
incorporate this proposal into the White Paper, the Commission evidently finds multiple
damages inconsistent with its current policy goals. See supra note 157 and accompanying
text.
353. See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
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is important where damages are small and thus probably fairly insignificant
to the individual plaintiffs involved.355 Furthermore, other mechanisms that
persuade plaintiffs to sue are only appropriate if deterrence is at least a
coequal goal. 356 Thus, the Commission can only truly justify its efforts if it
acknowledges the importance of deterrence in private as well as public
enforcement. 357
B. Devising a Workable System
EU private antitrust enforcement will not increase beyond current levels
without greater reform than the White Paper proposes. Problems will
forestall litigation for plaintiffs with smaller claims and more limited
resources even if the EU enacts a directive mirroring the entire White
Paper. Thus, the Commission will only achieve its goals if it offers
potential plaintiffs greater incentives to litigate; this includes liberalizing its
views on the attorney-driven nature of private enforcement. Furthermore,
EU policy makers cannot wholly reject individual aspects of the U.S.
system if they expect to create an instantly functional private enforcement
system.
1. Facilitating Litigation
Private antitrust enforcement in the EU is deficient under the current
system because litigation is simply not possible for many plaintiffs. 358 If
the EU implements the White Paper reforms, this will probably not change.
In the absence of contingent fees, potential plaintiffs have to fund their own
lawsuits, which is a risk that most private individuals and smaller
companies cannot take.359 With the "loser-pays" rule in most member
states, this risk only increases-plaintiffs face the possibility of paying their
adversaries' fees and costs in addition to their own.360 If the EU reforms
included contingent fees, then the risk would shift to plaintiffs' attorneys,
who are generally far more able to bear the up-front costs of litigation. 361
Introducing contingent fees into EU antitrust litigation would even make
the "loser-pays" rule more palatable for plaintiffs-if their attorneys
assumed this additional risk, they would simply be more careful in selecting
their cases. 362
Moreover, both opt-out class actions and multiple damages have a
tremendous impact on the cost-effectiveness (and thus the feasibility) of an
antitrust damages action. Antitrust lawsuits are complex and
355. See supra text accompanying note 181.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 350-53.
357. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
359. See supra text accompanying notes 269-72, 277-80.
360. See supra text accompanying notes 236, 239.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 278-80.
362. See supra text accompanying notes 288, 326-27.
2744 [Vol. 78
EU ANTITRUST DAMAGES ACTIONS
expensive363-without treble damages, it may cost a party more to litigate a
claim than it stands to gain from the action. Furthermore, without opt-out
class actions, litigation would likely be too expensive for most parties to
pursue. 364 Aggregate litigation, whether opt-in or opt-out, is fundamentally
a way for plaintiffs to pursue their claims when each one cannot reasonably
pursue his claim alone.365 In an opt-in system, however, a plaintiff may
face substantial hurdles to joining the litigation.366 In the most basic
scenario, the injured party simply does not know about the lawsuit. 367 To
resolve this problem, attorneys have to engage in expensive campaigns to
recruit potential plaintiffs.368 This raises the cost of litigation to the point
where it might no longer be worthwhile. An opt-out system, on the other
hand, includes all similarly situated parties by default, thus saving costs and
making litigation a reality for many more plaintiffs. 369
2. Incentivizing Litigation
To establish a private enforcement system where parties with smaller
injuries and less resources receive compensation, the Commission has to do
more than make litigation possible-it has to make it attractive to potential
plaintiffs. Currently, in most member states, parties with a small antitrust
claim have little to no incentive to sue.370 The White Paper's reforms do
little to expand these incentives.371 Ultimately, EU policy makers may
have to become more comfortable with a system where attorneys drive
private enforcement forward. 372
The White Paper proposals for collective redress and single damages will
not motivate litigants with small claims to sue. Human inertia will prevent
most litigants from joining an opt-in collective action unless they stand to
gain substantially. 373 In an opt-out system, plaintiffs do not need to take
any action to join a class, thus making participation far more probable.374
Representative actions might have a larger impact, but consumer groups
may not adequately represent the consumers' interests. 375 Furthermore,
without the availability of a multiple damage award, plaintiffs with small
363. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
364. See supra Part II.A.1.
365. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75, 181, 190.
366. See supra text accompanying notes 219-22.
367. See supra text accompanying note 221.
368. See supra text accompanying note 225; cf supra text accompanying note 195.
369. See supra text accompanying notes 192, 223.
370. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
371. See infra notes 373-79 and accompanying text.
372. This is one of the main reasons why the United States has a more robust private
antitrust enforcement system than the EU. See supra text accompanying notes 208-09. In
Part III.C, infra, this Note discredits the Commission's claim that an attorney-driven system
will harm the economy with excessive and meritless litigation.
373. See supra text accompanying note 218.
374. See supra text accompanying notes 216-23.
375. See supra Part II.A.l.d.ii.
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claims will not be lured into court. 376 Multiplying damages, whether or not
it deters antitrust violations, has the effect of encouraging litigation where it
is otherwise undesirable. 377
Furthermore, the lack of contingent fees and the presence of the "loser-
pays" rule make it extremely unattractive for potential plaintiffs to sue, even
if they are able to handle the financial risks involved.378 To achieve its goals,
the Commission should thus consider either disposing of the "loser-pays"
rule or allowing for contingent fees. This would ease the burden on potential
litigants and make them more comfortable bringing their claims to court. 379
Notwithstanding the Commission's overt criticism of the attorney-driven
nature of the U.S. system, 380 it will likely need to embrace the U.S. model
to some degree to realize the extent of its goals. The combination of class
actions, contingent fees, and the absence of a "loser-pays" rule allows
litigation to proceed on behalf of more parties at risk only to their
attorneys. 381 This is by far the best way to ensure that litigation is prevalent
and that injured parties are compensated: because lawyers are much more
willing and able to take this risk than their clients, plaintiffs are much more
likely under this system to pursue their claims. 382 Naturally, this will give
the attorney the largest stake in the litigation, 383 but the attorney's interests
are at least initially aligned with those of his clients. 384 Under the system
that the Commission is proposing, there is less risk of attorney abuse, 385 but
there is a far greater chance that injured parties will not receive damages.386
3. Tying the System Together
The nature of competition enforcement systems is such that it would be
very difficult for the EU to pick and choose what procedures to import from
the United States. 387 Effective private enforcement requires a large number
of litigants; to achieve this, the whole procedural regime must work
376. See supra notes 148, 260-61 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 148, 260-61 and accompanying text.
378. See supra text accompanying notes 236, 239. The Commission's suggestion that
member states let plaintiffs know early on in the litigation whether the "loser-pays" rule will
apply would be an improvement on the status quo, but the plaintiffs would still be
responsible for their own costs if they lose. See supra text accompanying note 243.
379. See supra text accompanying notes 236, 239.
380. See supra notes 201, 291 and accompanying text.
381. See supra Part II.A.l.d.i, 3.b.
382. See supra Part II.A.3.b.
383. See supra text accompanying note 210.
384. See supra note 292 and accompanying text. To the extent that the client and counsel
interests are at odds, the procedural rules should impose limits on the attorneys' actions and
subject their decisions to judicial scrutiny. See infra Part III.C.2.
385. See supra Part II.A.3.d; infra Part III.C.2.
386. See supra notes 373-79 and accompanying text.
387. See supra note 173.
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together to incentivize lawsuits and limit risks. 388 At an OECD roundtable
discussion, Professor Andrew I. Gavil further emphasized that each
procedural element is interdependent and that reforming one without the
others would likely be difficult or ineffective. 389 It is thus hard to believe
that the EU will be able to revitalize private antitrust enforcement simply by
implementing a directive guaranteeing class action or collective action
rights;390 the Commission would still likely fall vastly short of its policy
goals.
For example, it is impracticable to create a system of opt-out class
actions where contingent fees (or equivalent mechanisms) are not available.
At the very least, the class representative would be responsible for the costs
and attorney's fees of the class as a whole. 391 This would make it difficult
if not impossible to find representatives willing to litigate on behalf of the
class. 392 With the addition of a "loser-pays" rule, plaintiffs' attorneys
would have even more trouble finding representatives willing to litigate. 393
If, however, the attorneys could cover the up-front costs for the class, then
introducing class actions would be effective. 394
Conversely, a system of contingent fees would only be viable if damages
are large enough for attorneys to want to litigate-that is, if they expect a
monetary judgment or settlement large enough to cover their expenses. 395
Absent class actions, which allow for a large grouping of individual claims,
and treble damages, which may allow even one party with a moderate claim
to seek sufficient damages, a plaintiff may not have a large enough claim to
warrant a lawsuit. 396  Private attorneys will likely not accept a fee
contingent upon the relatively "modest" amount of damages currently
available in most member states.3
97
Furthermore, the EU must also find a way to incorporate (or at least find
a suitable alternative to) the factors not covered in this Note, such as
indirect purchaser standing and discovery rights.398 To strengthen private
antitrust enforcement, the Commission will have to overcome opposition in
388. See generally supra Part II.A (measuring the White Paper and U.S. procedural
approaches by how well they served to encourage parties to litigate).
389. See supra note 173.
390. See supra text accompanying note 165.
391. See supra Part II.A.3.b.
392. Because a class representative would have to cover the risk of his fellow class
members, there would be a strong incentive for potential class representatives to wait for
someone else to sue for their damages. See Mulheron, supra note 184, at 430 ("[Cllass
members ... may prefer that others 'bore the grief of the litigation, but are willing to 'piggy
back' in any subsequent litigation .... ).
393. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
394. See supra Part II.A.3.b.
395. See supra Part II.A.3.b.
396. See supra notes 174-75, 260-61 and accompanying text.
397. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 163, 173 and accompanying text.
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the member states and find a way truly to liberalize procedures. 399 Unless
and until that happens, the Commission will not meet its goals, and antitrust
damages actions in the EU will remain scarce.
C. A Closer Look at the EU's Concerns
While political concerns may not currently allow for the implementation
of U.S.-style procedures for EU antitrust plaintiffs, 40 0 the Commission's
perceptions of the U.S. system are misguided. It is true that any system
driven by private profit incentives is vulnerable to mischief.401 However,
critics of the U.S. system fail to acknowledge that the EU may prevent this
by placing robust checks and balances on plaintiffs' attorneys.402 Some EU
policy makers think that the U.S. system creates "excesses" where lawyers
run afoul, harming their clients and businesses in the pursuit of profits.40 3
However, this is not the case that one observes with U.S. antitrust plaintiffs'
attorneys. 40 4 Antitrust is somewhat less susceptible to abuse than other
fields of litigation-cases are few and costly, and it is more difficult to
proceed with a meritless claim. 405 Moreover, the U.S. private enforcement
system places strict limits on standing, and it prevents plaintiffs from
initiating a costly lawsuit where there is only tenuous evidence. 40 6
Furthermore, U.S. federal civil procedure corrects the problem of diverging
counsel and client interests by imposing judicial scrutiny on class action
settlement agreements. 407
Adopting U.S.-style procedures simply would not create a "litigation
culture" where plaintiffs' attorneys work against the interest of their clients,
courts are flooded with lawsuits, and businesses are deterred from engaging
in procompetitive conduct. With sufficient checks and balances like those
imposed in the United States, antitrust plaintiffs' attorneys will not be the
destructive force that the Commission suggests.
1. Antitrust Lawyers Gone Wild?
Whereas excessive litigation might very well be harmful to a competition
enforcement system, adopting U.S.-style procedures for antitrust will not
produce the "litigation bonanza" that the EU expects. 408  In antitrust
litigation, parties are motivated by costs, risks, and expected payoffs. 40 9 An
399. See supra text accompanying notes 165-68; see also supra Part I.B (describing some
EU policy makers' resistance to adopting more pro-plaintiff procedures).
400. See supra Part I.B; supra text accompanying notes 165-68.
401. See supra Introduction; see, e.g., supra Part II.A.3.d.
402. See supra Part II.A.3.d; infra Part III.C.2.
403. See supra Parts I.B, II.A. 1.c.
404. See infra Part III.C. 1.
405. See supra Part II.B. 1.
406. See supra Part II.B.2.
407. See supra Part II.A.3.d.
408. See supra note 81.
409. See supra notes 315-17 and accompanying text.
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antitrust attorney is unlikely to take a case of limited merit on a contingent
fee410-particularly because there are relatively few antitrust lawsuits and
because there is such a heavy expense in litigating each one.41'
Furthermore, after Twombly, the notion that U.S. defendants settle
tenuous claims to avoid high litigation costs is completely erroneous. 412
Now, even to reach discovery, plaintiffs in federal court need to possess
enough evidence to present a "plausible" theory of harm.413 The Supreme
Court made clear that its ruling was necessary to prevent expensive fishing
expeditions that extort settlements. 414 Therefore, in prospectively assessing
their conduct, firms will only consider the risk of credible claims, as courts
will swiftly dismiss everything else.415 Thus, instead of dismissing the idea
of U.S.-style litigation entirely, 416 the Commission should consider this sort
of procedural safeguard that would prevent the very scenarios it fears.417
Additionally, importing U.S. procedural mechanisms will likely not yield
an increase in litigation beyond what is desirable. First, procedures that
enable litigation may deter violations of the EU antitrust laws so that there
are less potential claims available. 418 Second, U.S. federal courts have for
over three decades limited antitrust standing-the Commission should
consider this as a potential means to limit the amount of antitrust litigation
and the types of parties that can sue for damages. 419 Third, European culture
is generally less litigious than American culture, so EU antitrust litigation
would likely not reach U.S. levels, even under the same procedural rules.420
2. Fully Aligning Class and Counsel Interests
The judicial check that CAFA places on plaintiffs' class action attorneys
further illustrates that the EU fears forestalling reform are inflated. 421
While the Commission believes that class actions and contingent fees lead
to agency problems,422 contingent fees clearly align the class and counsel
interests toward reaching a judgment or settlement.423 While the attorney's
interests may diverge from those of his clients in the distribution of
damages and awarding of fees,424 the United States now ensures that the
410. See supra text accompanying notes 286, 288-89.
411. See supra notes 324-27 and accompanying text.
412. See supra text accompanying notes 335-40.
413. See supra notes 337-38 and accompanying text.
414. See Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007); supra text
accompanying notes 339-40.
415. See supra notes 322-23, 339-40 and accompanying text.
416. See supra note 40 and accompanying text; supra Part I.B.
417. See supra text accompanying notes 205-07.
418. See supra notes 318-20 and accompanying text.
419. See supra text accompanying notes 329-34.
420. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
421. See supra Part II.A.3.d.
422. See supra text accompanying note 291.
423. See supra Part II.A.3.c; supra note 292 and accompanying text.
424. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
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class members' interests are still protected.425 CAFA serves to prevent
obtuse outcomes where the defendants and the plaintiffs' attorneys can
reach a mutually beneficial agreement that either does not benefit or harms
the financial interests of the class members.426
To the extent that the Commission fears that antitrust class actions would
favor attorneys at the expense of the class,427 it should offer in its directive
a CAFA-like check on EU plaintiffs' attorneys. This would be a far more
direct way to implement a functional private antitrust enforcement system
than flatly rejecting the U.S. model. By crafting a system with sufficient
checks and balances, the EU can perhaps fulfill its goal of compensating
plaintiffs with smaller claims and also prevent potential attorney abuses.428
CONCLUSION
The Commission's dialogue on damages actions has succeeded in
motivating larger parties to litigate their EU antitrust claims. 429 However,
the reforms in the 2008 White Paper did not go far enough to assist
plaintiffs with less resources and smaller claims who face procedural and
not just psychological hurdles to litigation.430 If the EU enacted the White
Paper proposals as drafted, potential plaintiffs would not be much more
likely to litigate than they are under the current system.431 Thus, without
greater action, the EU will not meet its goals and will not reap the potential
benefits that a stronger private enforcement system would bring to the
European internal market. 432
Moreover, while the Commission appropriately recognizes that there is
potential for attorney abuse in the U.S. system,433 it ignores the safeguards
that the United States has set up to protect parties on either side. 434 Despite
clear political opposition,435 the Commission would best serve its policy
goals by embracing both the U.S.-style procedures that facilitate litigation and
the U.S.-style mechanisms designed to keep attorneys in check.436 Finally,
EU policy makers should acknowledge that they may not meet their goals
immediately or with a single directive-a viable private enforcement system
will not emerge overnight, and they will likely need to hone it over time.
425. See supra notes 304-09 and accompanying text.
426. See supra notes 304-09 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 294, 299-02
and accompanying text (describing some of the instances of attorney abuse that motivated
the U.S. Congress to pass the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005).
427. See supra text accompanying note 291.
428. See, e.g., supra notes 304-09 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
430. See supra Part III.B.
431. See supra Part III.B.
432. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
433. See supra text accompanying note 50.
434. See supra notes 412-17, 419, 421-28 and accompanying text.
435. See supra Part I.B; supra text accompanying note 168.
436. See supra Part III.B-C.
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